(The following is a text on which is based Perspectives "Accommodation
not confrontation" published in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
January/February 1999, pp. 14-16. The Bulletin is on the web at: www.bullatomsci.org)
Last May's nuclear detonations in the Pokhran Desert
and in the Ras Koh mountain range presented the
world with its seventh and eighth nuclear-weapon states. Israel became
the sixth in 1967. To make
matters worse, as Lloyd Axworthy (Canada's foreign minister) warned
a "new nuclear realpolitik" was
being enunciated not only by known nuclear proliferators--India, Pakistan,
and Israel-but also by the five
declared nuclear weapon states, justifying the proliferation or continuing
retention of nuclear weapons.
In moving to rely on nuclear weapons for their security,
thus emulating the five declared nuclear-weapon
states (NWS), India and Pakistan served up a major challenge to the
nuclear non-proliferation regime,
for which the international community still lacks an appropriate diplomatic
tool box. Early on, the Security
Council and the Group of Eight Industrialized Nations (G-8) were unable
to reach consensus on
sanctions, however their later pronouncements, while containing calls
for nuclear restraint by India and
Pakistan, were replete with hypocrisy regarding the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) nuclear
disarmament obligations of the five NWS. Furthermore, the howls of
outrage from Western countries
such as Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, and Japan among others were
equally bereft in credibility or
moral force as all of these countries continue to benefit from extended
nuclear deterrence (provided by
the United States).
Following the May tests, the United States imposed
sanctions mandated by the 1994 Nuclear
Proliferation Prevention Act (Glenn amendment) on both India and Pakistan
that prohibited the export of
sensitive technologies, military and foreign assistance, official credits
or credit guaranties, lending by U.S.
commercial banks, and the U.S. withdrew its support for World Bank
and International Monetary Fund
loans. However, by mid-summer agricultural exports had been exempted
in response to complaints by
farmers in the United States, and by early November the sanctions regime
was further eased to cover
only high technology and military equipment exports. This was to reward
India and Pakistan for
announcing testing moratoria and for their pledges to sign the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty
by September 1999. Subsequently, a list was published identifying 40
Indian and 46 Pakistani entities
along with a number of subordinate entities, which were covered by
export restrictions under the Clinton
Administration's sanctions policy, and which were barred from any dealing
with U.S. firms or government
agencies--in all over 300 entities were listed.
In its dealings with New Delhi and Islamabad, Washington has focused on three priorities:
preventing any escalation of a nuclear and
missile race;
minimizing damage to the non-proliferation
regime; and
promoting bilateral dialogue between India
and Pakistan on reducing tensions--crucially
differences over Kashmir.
The United States also helped establish the non-proliferation benchmarks
set out by the Security Council
(Res. 1172 of June 6) and the G-8, for India and Pakistan to move back
from the nuclear brink by:
signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test
Ban Treaty;
halting all further production of weapon-usable
fissile material and joining the negotiation on a
fissile material treaty at the Conference
on Disarmament;
limiting development and deployment of delivery
vehicles for weapons of mass destruction
(WMD);
implementing strict export controls on sensitive
materials and technologies for WMD; and
resuming bilateral dialogue on resolving long-standing
tensions and disputes, including Jammu and
Kashmir.
In the past, Washington's South Asia policy has been
a failure, mainly due to successive generations of
policy makers regarding the region as beset with intractable conflict
and war, frustration emanating from
ill-conceived or poorly executed regional initiatives, trying to choose
between Pakistan or India, and the
absence of South Asia from the U.S. geo-strategic policy map except
in cases of acute crisis. However,
since May 1998, the U.S. approach has tended to be uncharacteristically
pragmatic though limited,
focusing on the art of the possible. It is based on the principle that
while neither India nor Pakistan can
ever be recognized as nuclear weapon states under the NPT, since both
countries have overtly
demonstrated their nuclear weapon capabilities--what has been tested
cannot be untested--the United
States must now reach a deal under which India and Pakistan would commit
to accepting the
benchmarks noted above.
In this context, seven separate rounds of negotiations
have been held between the United States and
India, and between the United States and Pakistan, trying to work out
an acceptable non-proliferation
and security architecture for South Asia. Traditionally the obstacles
to nuclear arms control and
confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in South Asia can
be traced to: a failure of
discourse on reasonable levels of conventional, nuclear, and ballistic
missile forces; an inability to evolve
a common strategic language incorporating arms control as an integral
component of national security
policy; and a failure to transform tacit bargaining into an explicit
strategic dialogue, thus resulting in an
emphasis on global nuclear disarmament at the cost of more modest region-specific
restraint measures.
In their negotiations with the United States, both
India and Pakistan have engaged in hard-nosed
bargaining. It appears that Washington has decided to opt for a strategy
of accommodation in a nuclear
South Asia, rather than one of appeasement or confrontation as some
of its critics have charged. As
such, Washington has remained unusually tight-lipped about the status
of its dealings with India and
Pakistan, to the extent of keeping even its close allies in the dark
The U.S. accommodation strategy calls
for a recognition that neither India nor Pakistan will give up its
nuclear weapon or ballistic missile
capabilities in the short- to medium term, hence the practical possibilities
are to be sympathetic to their
respective security dilemmas, to aim for restraint in the development
and deployment of nuclear
weapons, to promote strategic dialogue between Pakistan and India as
well as between India and China,
to demonstrate flexibility in sanctions by waiving restrictions on
economic assistance and
military-to-military contacts, to provide expertise in implementation
of export controls on WMD
materials and technologies, and to engage in technical discussions
on restraints on nuclear weapons
including safety, security, and chain of custody. Apparently, France
too is discussing certain types of high
technology cooperation with India, such as in the field of inertial
confinement fusion (ICF) and advanced
laser research for peaceful purposes.
In its negotiations with the United States, India's goals have included, among others:
recognition of India's status as a regional
and a global power;
mitigation of the effects of a United States-China
strategic alliance;
lifting of technology sanctions;
sharing of information and data on sub-critical
tests and simulation technology for nuclear weapon
safety and reliability;
keeping the Kashmir dispute a bilateral matter
between itself and Pakistan; and
achieving progress at the multilateral level
on global nuclear disarmament.
Among Pakistan's goals are: securing essentially
the same package as does India from the U.S. in terms
of non-proliferation, economic assistance, and technology sharing;
U.S. and/or international intervention
in resolving the Kashmir dispute; easing the threat of war in the region;
and salvaging its crumbling
economy.
Since the May tests, India and Pakistan's heads of
government, foreign secretaries, and other senior
officials have met bilaterally in several fora both within and outside
the region. These discussions have
been based on an agreed framework to:
1) address all outstanding issues of concern to both sides, including, inter alia--
peace and security, including CSBMs;
Jammu and Kashmir;
Siachen glacier;
Wullar Barrage / Tulbul Navigation Project;
Sir Creek demarcation;
terrorism and drug trafficking;
economic and commercial cooperation;
promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields.
2) set up a mechanism, including working groups at
appropriate levels, to address all of these issues in
an integrated manner.
It was agreed that the issues of peace and security,
as well as Jammu and Kashmir, would be dealt with
at the level of the foreign secretaries.
At the last round of talks between Foreign Secretaries
Shamshad Ahmed (Pakistan) and Krishnan
Raghunath (India), held in Islamabad in mid-October, Pakistan proposed
a non-aggression pact, with a
provision to set up a dispute resolution mechanism, as well as measures
to prevent air space violations,
prior notification of military exercises, and upgrading of military
communication links. India which had
already declared a no-first use of nuclear weapons policy asked for
reciprocation, advance notice of
ballistic missile flight tests, non-targeting of population and economic
centers, military-to-military
exchanges, and upgrading of communication links between the prime ministers
and foreign secretaries.
However, disagreements over key issues such as Kashmir and nuclear
restraint measures prevented
agreement on other CSBMs even where some common ground existed.
In the post-Cold War world, the best chances for
controlling proliferation in all its aspects is to attack the
problem in all its aspects--that is, to address both the horizontal
and vertical dimensions of proliferation,
together with the ballistic and cruise missiles and advanced fighter-bomber
aircraft. Global norms need to
be truly universal in their application and scope if they are to be
credible and effective. Such norms must
not serve to perpetuate possession of certain types of weapons of mass
destruction for a select few while
at the same time outlawing them for the rest. Concurrently, regional
norms need to address the sources of
conflict that generate the demand for weapon systems. At the same time
the nuclear weapon states, more
appropriately termed as the original proliferators of weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic and cruise
missiles--the United States, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, France
and China--who coincidentally
are also the largest purveyors of conventional weapons and sensitive
dual-use technologies, must
exercise serious restraint in arms sales and technology transfers.
The nuclear security dilemma in South Asia remains
centered on the fact that nuclear proliferation and
nuclear security are interlinked: Pakistan versus India; India versus
China; China versus Russia, and
Russia versus the United States. Regional security efforts in South
Asia, therefore, can be served only by
recognizing that both Pakistan and India are at a strategic crossroads.
They can opt for the continuing
development and deployment of nuclear and missile forces. Or they can
reduce the proliferation dangers
through CSBMs that strengthen mutual trust and regional security.
At the regional level, India and Pakistan could be
encouraged and assisted to consider a variety of
bilateral (and multilateral) discussions and agreements to maintain
current tacit limited-deployment
practices regarding nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, to agree
on some measure of sufficiency in
terms of weapon-usable fissile material stocks, warheads and weapon
systems; to negotiate and
implement a package of regional CSBMs; and to actively contribute to
the universalization of current
global non-proliferation norms.
The United States and the Group of Eight Industrialized
Nations should remove all sanctions save those
directly related to the transfer of WMD technologies and advanced conventional
weapons, thus
facilitating a short-term focus on a South Asian nuclear non-proliferation
strategy that could involve
several inter-related components, which are only briefly described
here:
India and Pakistan must maintain their respective
moratoria on further nuclear testing, and must
ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), while those states whose ratification
is required for entry-into-force must also
ratify the treaty unconditionally in quick order so that it
can be brought into force through the mechanism
of a political conference scheduled for fall 1999;
Non-weaponization or limited-deployment of
nuclear-weapon capabilities, including a commitment
of non-use of WMD, against the back-drop of
the ratification and implementation of START II,
and negotiation of START III and follow on
strategic arms reduction treaties;
Positive contribution to the negotiation of
a fissile material treaty (FMT) at the Conference on
Disarmament--including a moratorium, at the
latest, by the year 2000 on new production of
weapon-usable fissile material, provided that
the FMT negotiating mandate includes ways of
capturing existing stocks of weapon-usable
fissile material in all five nuclear weapon states as well
as in India, Israel, and Pakistan;
Limits on the deployment of ballistic missiles
and agreement on prior notification of ballistic missile
flight-tests;
Activation and upgrading of the "hot line"
already set up for periodic communication between
senior military leaders, with the United States
providing appropriate technological and financial
assistance;
Establishment of a functional risk-reduction
center, with United States expertise, technology and
funding--to include technical discussions
on averting the consequences of the Y2K problem in
India and Pakistan's nuclear and missile infrastructures,
and discussions on prevention of
dangerous military activities;
On-going meetings involving senior military
officers and government officials from India and
Pakistan to discuss global and regional security
issues--including conventional force balance
stability, crisis stability and crisis management,
no re-transfer or export of nuclear and missile
technologies without adequate safeguards,
etc., and to discuss the framework for a common
strategic language for ensuring regional security
at the lowest levels of deployed conventional and
unconventional weapons;
Convene meetings involving officials from
India, Pakistan, and the IAEA to discuss adherence to
and compliance with relevant IAEA conventions
on physical protection and nuclear safety, and a
tri-lateral dialogue on technical cooperation
and monitoring of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and
Good governance and community building activities
involving the participation of academics,
journalists, parliamentarians, and businesspersons
from India and Pakistan.
A regionally focused approach to deal with the proliferation
dilemma lies in resolving or ameliorating the
security concerns that have generated the requirement for the development
and acquisition of nuclear
weapons in South Asia. At the same time, it is essential that the political
currency of nuclear weapons be
devalued in the post-Cold War age. As long as the nuclear weapon states
and their allies rely for their
security on nuclear weapons, it is perceived as illogical by the de
facto nuclear weapon states to deny
them the same rationale.
In addition to maintaining existing global mechanisms
to control proliferation, it is becoming increasingly
obvious that the nuclear weapon states must themselves move away from
reliance on nuclear weapons
for their security, if they expect other countries to do the same and
to respect global non-proliferation
norms. The new nuclear realpolitik of mission creep in nuclear weapons
employment policy in the nuclear
weapon states, as well as justifications for nuclear and missile proliferation
in South Asia, the Middle East
and elsewhere, must be effectively countered and rejected in multilateral
fora such as the
Non-Proliferation Treaty review process, the Conference on Disarmament,
the First Committee, and the
NATO strategic concept review. The new nuclear realpolitik cannot be
allowed to stand.
For the foreseeable future, a nuclear South Asia
is here to stay for better or for worse. Pragmatic arms
control strategies must therefore focus on prudent accommodation, not
appeasement or confrontation.
South Asia is sufficiently different from other regions of conflict
that a prudent yet pragmatic
accommodation strategy need not set a precedent.
30 December 1998
trauf@miis.edu