With the exception of about forty pages, this is a rather decent book. However, it is unfortunate though, that these forty or so pages, mar the quality of the book, where scholarship turns into pamphleteering. Not that there is anything wrong with pamphleteering. In fact, the fact that a senior World Bank official, or any academic or scholar, ventures into pamphleteering, is to be welcomed. What is unfortunate though, is that in this present context, Ishrat Husain undermines his own analysis and scholarship by a sort of pamphleteering that is based more on wishful think and detracts considerably from the analysis that he undertakes for the major part of this book. Ishrat Husain's Economic and Social Agenda for the 21st Century, sounds more like Alice in Wonderland with a wish list, rather than anything worth serious thought.

The analysis in much of this book, is of high quality, especially for the period 1947-88. The nature of analysis undertaken by Ishrat Husain, is more of that of a scholar, who has spent some time and effort understanding past developments in Pakistan, than that of a senior World Bank bureaucrat. Unlike many of his Pakistani colleagues at the Bank, Ishrat Husain has taken the trouble of presenting a realistic picture of Pakistanís past economic development, and his analysis, for the most part, is devoid of the extensive biases which form the opinion of personnel at the World Bank. This is scholarship of quality and numerous examples will highlight this fact.

It is very fashionable today, to deride the contribution made by state intervention in the process of economic growth and development. Current conventional wisdom has it, that the role of the state should be minimised, and that the market should become the main institution to determine the distribution and allocation of resources in an economy. Most individuals who hold this latter view, also look at history through these same spectacles, and hence, undermine the role the state has played in previous development. Although Ishrat Husain also subscribes to the view that the market should be allowed to dominate in the distribution of resources, an important contribution of his work is that he gives credit where it is due. Most scholars acknowledge the hugely positive role played by the state and its institutions in promoting growth in Pakistan, before it became customary to ridicule this role. Ishrat Husain also emphasizes this in his book and gives ample credit to government policy, especially in the 1960s, where state policy played a key role in increasing output.

He argues that it was a "whole series of government policy measures" which were responsible for the high rates in agricultural output in the sixties, and that "effective public price support for major crops, subsidies to popularise new inputs, and enhanced credit facilities" all played an important role, as did "large public investments". By today's logic, subsidies, directed credit, and public support for prices, are considered interventions that distort factor prices resulting in inefficient and suboptimal outcomes. Fortunately, Ishrat Husain does not let his opinion bias facts that have been well documented, debated and established. Another refreshing intervention by him regards the nature over the controversy regarding the impact of industrialisation in the sixties.

Many, in fact, most assessments by World Bank staff regarding the consequences of the industrial policy followed through in the earlier years of Pakistanís existence, are damning. Researchers have argued, that by following the path of import-substituting-industrialisation, Pakistan ended up with a highly inefficient and over-protected industrial sector. However, Ishrat Husain argues that since "industrialization was the rage in development economics in the late 1940s and 1950s" and that, "the mantra of the early years was that industrialization was the recipe for success", it was not surprising that almost all underdeveloped countries, including Pakistan, felt that this was the first step forward towards development. Despite this, numerous studies have tried to argue that this was a mistake. However, Ishrat Husain is surprisingly unprejudiced, and presents ample evidence citing studies which counter this World Bank bias. He even goes to some length by explaining this alternative view, which has concluded that in the sixties, "the negative effects of protectionism on industrial performance were overstated".

Ishrat Husain's observations over Pakistan's trade regime and export performance and on privatization, also present different interpretations from those commonly voiced as dogma, which one has come to expect from staff members of the international finance institutions. He argues that since 1995, ëPakistan has devalued its currency several times but the impact on export expansion has been minimal, and shows that despite many criticisms, Pakistan ëhas managed to build a competitive export sectorí, with ëspectacular growth rates in nontraditional exports. On privatization he writes, "criticism of public inefficiencies has been matched by criticisms of inappropriate privatization", and that "privatization will only change the locus of ownership" and will "achieve few economic gains" unless changes are made in other sectors of the economy.

The main achievement of this book is that, for the most part, it presents a balanced and stimulating analysis of Pakistan's process of economic development. This feature notwithstanding, there are numerous problems with Ishrat Husain's interpretation that need to be challenged.

While the book is competent in its understanding of developments between the period 1947-88, the fact that the last decade 1988-98, has been dealt with so callously, unfortunately shows Ishrat Husain's true colours. He calls this period of the return to democracy in Pakistan as the period of "muddling through". While he holds forth on the economic and political developments that have taken place in this decade, curiously, there is a key player which has been overlooked and is mentioned only once or twice in passing. He argues that in the 1990s, "the economic policy formulation has been in the right direction but actual implementation has been erratic, inconsistent and poor", and "since 1988 while Pakistan has negotiated successive agreements for achieving macroeconomic stabilization with the IMF" none of the agreements have been completed. As a result, there has been lower economic growth, stagnant exports, higher rates of inflation and a serious debt burden. The ëeconomic policy formationí which was in "the right direction", was the policies formulated by the IMF and the World Bank since 1988. Clearly, Ishrat Husain believes that by not following through these policies, economic indicators have worsened.

A great deal of research has been done on the impact of the structural adjustment and stabilization programmes followed through by all the political regimes since 1988 in Pakistan, and there is very little evidence which supports Ishrat Husain's conclusions. In fact, all the studies conducted so far show precisely that IMF and World Bank programmes have had very severe repercussions on Pakistanís economy and upon the people of this country. There is ample evidence that shows that since the acceptance of these programmes in 1988, there has been a substantial slowing down in economic growth, an increase in poverty, a worsening of the balance of payments situation, and growing unemployment. This glaring omission in Ishrat Husainís analysis of the period since 1988 reveals his prejudices which were more subdued in his study of the 1947-88 period, perhaps because the World Bank and IMF were not such dominant players in Pakistan in the earlier years. Unfortunately, much of the ëbalanceí which one finds in the analysis of the 1947-88 period , is lost in the last decade of Pakistanís existence.

While the omission, leave alone, criticism, of the IMF and World Bank in Pakistan's affairs, can be explained away due to Ishrat Husain's expediency, his overall analysis which provides the main arguments of the book, reveal weaknesses in his way of thinking and conceptualisation, especially considering his overall thesis. He defines the elite as a coalition of the landed aristocracy, industrialists and big business, the civil and military bureaucrats, and professionals. The main thesis of Ishrat Husain is that this elite group, accounting for "less than one percent of the population", has captured the institutions of the state and of the market, completely. He writes that both economic and political power is held by this elite, who have "rigged" the market and "hijacked" the state in order to deliver most of the benefits of the economic growth that has taken place in Pakistan, to itself. Unfortunately, Ishrat Husain focuses solely on this elite, without looking at the dynamics of the remaining "ninety-nine percent of the population". From his book, it seems, that only this elite has benefited from whatever economic development that has taken place in Pakistan, and there is no recognition of the impact of the process of economic development on anyone else.

All the evidence available, both scholarly and anecdotal, suggests very strongly, that there has been extensive social, economic and political transformation in Pakistan. This is not adequately recognised by Ishrat Husain in his highly economistic analysis. The nature of the transformation has affected not primarily "less than one percent of the population" as Ishrat Husain contends, but a very large majority of the country. No one in their right minds with even a cursory familiarity of Pakistan would argue that growth has not filtered down, and despite an "elitist" growth model, the majority in Pakistan have benefited. In the last fifty years, huge strides have been made in the transformation of economic and social structures and relations, allowing a growing number of Pakistanis to participate in the benefits of growth and development. For Ishrat Husain, there is little awareness of this process. For example, he writes that the "fundamental feudal structure" has not been altered in Pakistan, and that "large land-owning classes have held the reins of political power since independence". However, most observers on Pakistan, who are probably more aware of the extent and nature of changes that have taken place in the last few decades than is Ishrat Husain, have argued that the "fundamental feudal structure" has been radically altered and has collapsed, and that the reins of power no longer rest with the "large land-owning classes".

Probably the most serious problem with this book is the Agenda for Change presented by Ishrat Husain. He presents "an agenda that lays down the main elements of a strategy which can bring about change". What is required, we are told as if we don't know, is "strong political will and commitment and patience, perseverance, and hard work by the whole society". We need this "political will and courage to make the right choice--that is, to move away from the corrupt system....". Furthermore, Ishrat Husain writes that "it is incumbent upon the present government to rise to the occasion and to prove that the strong mandate given to it will be used only for one purpose, i.e., laying the foundations of a just and fair society!" He continues: "the process of accountability if put in place constitutionally and enforced in practice vigorously...." will ensure that this agenda is fulfilled. According to his agenda, the judicial system and financial institutions should be purged of political interference. This wishful thinking detracts sharply from the author's own analysis, much of which is rooted in concrete facts and reality.

It is strange that Ishrat Husain has produced an Agenda for Change which weakens his own analysis and documentation. His analysis and entire thesis rest on the premise that the "less than one percent" "narrow self-centred elite" is responsible for all the ills that affect Pakistan, who have usurped economic and political power. One wonders how, then, this agenda of change is to be enforced. It is not clear who his constituency is, for the same people that he is preaching to, are in fact those responsible for the problems as he defines them, in the first place. One example will explain this position better. He calls upon academics, think tanks, research institutes and professionals to be party to his agenda, yet he argues, correctly that "research institutes have become hotbeds of internal bickerings [sic] and rivalries rather than generators of ideas, processes and products". In a country where academics and economists are more interested in seeking public office by endorsing every government's economic policies, or spend a better part of their professional life posing as consultants, rather than teaching or doing research, Ishrat Husain's appeals sound particularly naive. It is unlikely that the "chattering classes" as he calls the professionals, would be willing to be party to a system that undermines their own interests and privileges.

Ishrat Husain's Agenda for Social Change sounds more like the pamphleteering of a political party, rather than the work of a scholar. Without question, intellectuals (if that is the right word) of the Millat Party, Jamaat Islami, Tehrik Insaaf, or even of the Muslim League would all eagerly endorse, and probably adopt, this Agenda, for it cannot be fulfilled. Few of us would disagree with his need for change and for reform of the numerous institutions which exist in this country; many of us would even agree with what needs to be done. However, by not articulating how this change is to be brought about, much of Ishrat Husain's scholarship is made redundant.

These conceptual issues notwithstanding, this book is worth a read, especially for its historical evaluation. Unfortunately though, the publishers Oxford University Press, need to improve their book publishing section. I counted fifty three proof reading errors in the book, and there are probably far more. Moreover, the tables which appear in each chapter appear at the end of the chapter rather than as a part of the text, making it more difficult to follow the author's argument. Also, headings and sub-headings in each chapter are barely distinguishable; a better editor would have improved the presentation of the book