Be it family, friendships or moral trappings, ultimately economic reality prevails. So it should not be surprising if feudal economic interests -- despite their bindings through marriages and all kinds of business and personal affiliations -- are in open conflict with the merchant/industrial classes in Pakistan's assemblies today.

Although the fight over agri-taxes is a proxy war, it reveals the basic conflict. For example, it is true that the merchants, industrialists and other business classes also cheat on state taxes. However, in the eyes of the law they are violating the rules with the connivance of the state machinery: they can be punished if proven guilty for non-payment of taxes.

On the contrary, as pointed out by Dr Samad, the feudalists are exempt from taxes: it is (or was) their constitutional right not to pay taxes. The feudalists practically sanctioned themselves the use of the state's public services without paying any dues.

The farm lobby's argument, of being cheated through price distortions and negative subsidies, seems to be (or may be) valid. Farmers do not get the right prices and, hence, wealth is transferred from rural agriculture to the urban sectors. But why have the feudalists, while ruling the country in one way or the other all these years, not raised this question before the threat of agri-tax became imminent? Was it due to their naivety and lack of cost-benefit analysis? This may be true, to some extent, as far as the small farmers are concerned but it is a different story with the landlords.

A better explanation is that the big farmers or the landlords were compensating themselves with having unlimited access to state largess. Expropriating state subsidies (meant for small farmers), usurping state lands, taking out loans at nominal interest rates without repayment, using government-paid staff to work on their personal farms, getting roads constructed to their remote villages for personal convenience and getting prime residential plots (worth millions) in the urban centres, were only a few of the unlimited economic benefits enjoyed by our big farmers. Social privileges and state-abetted control over their subjects, the bonded labour, is a well-known phenomenon in feudal belts; a feudalist can get away with murder with little or no trouble.

While the feudal lords were getting more than their share, for paying minimal amounts of 'abiana' and 'malia', the conflict did not come into full focus in previous decades. Most prominently, unlike India, where business classes were relatively matured and feudalism was swiftly eliminated through land reforms, the merchant/industrial class had not come into their own in Pakistan until late; these forces may still be half-baked.

Now, when the booty has shrunk, the state is bankrupt and near collapse, and the awareness among other classes has increased, the conflict has been sharpened. Despite over-pragmatic ideological trappings, alleged corrupt business practices and faulty governance, the rise of the Sharif house -- replacing the seemingly never-ending dominance of the feudal gentry -- is a historical indicator of maturation of the merchant/industrial classes in Pakistan.

The feudalist's outlook is usually localised: to please his immediate constituencies at best and appoint patwaris, tehsildars and police officials of his choice to gain benefits. On the other hand, the merchant/business class, always eager to expand markets, has to have a much broader vision of society. For example, while even a good and caring feudal legislator would be interested in the farm roads of his area only, the business classes will be well served by improved transportation infrastructure at the national level. Just taking it at a symbolic level, it is no accident that Nawaz Sharif is obsessed with building the Motorway while Benazir's priorities were geared towards Larkana.

Pakistan, ruled by the feudal gentry in collusion with the religious conservative forces, comes very close to classic feudalism. However, the collapse of societal and state institutions reflect the incapacity of feudal elite to run a modern state, which Pakistan has been trying to be. In a way, inadvertently, the interjection of military rules were also meant to fill the gap left by the feudalists in running a modern politico-economic system. Ironically, most of the time the military elite also tried to consolidate their rule with the help of the same feudalists but the fundamental character of the state did not change.

Now, when all traditional alternatives have failed, the ushering in of the business classes in a leadership role seems to be a logical step. However, the entrenched feudal gentry is fighting tooth and nail to preserve its sanctity. It is a class conflict in every sense of the word.

Idealists, moralists and empiricists have been trying to prove that either the explanation of historical evolution through class conflict is/was invalid, or such tools of analysis were only applicable to the Western societies at a certain time. When Adam Smith, Sismondi (contrary to common belief, Karl Marx did not pioneer the theory of class conflict) and the German school were propounding the theory of evolution of human society (passing through stages of slavery, feudalism and capitalism, propelled by class conflicts), their theories were attacked by similar arguments. But the raging class war between the feudalists and the merchant/industrial classes reaffirms the basic tenants of the classical theory.

Some point out that the prevalence of mechanised farming and use of wage labourers (replacing the serf-like tenants) has already brought an end to what was known as feudalism. Therefore, they hold that to portray class conflict in terms of feudalists versus merchants/industrialists is a redundant argument. One can concede that feudalism has gone through changes but, as an overall system, it still remains the same.

The elimination of the feudal system also depends upon the proliferation of the manufacturing and industrial sector. The basis of feudalism may have been seriously eroded and its sharp edges may have been blunted, but the overall system cannot wither away unless industrial production does not get rooted in all spheres of life.

For example, farm states in the US still have feudalistic overbearings. Although a tiny population, less than 5 per cent, is engaged in agriculture, the overall character of American industrial society is not affected significantly. Similarly, feudalism will only disappear when an overwhelming proportion of society does not depend upon farming for its living.

However, while the feudalists are fighting a class war to preserve their privileges, their arguments -- advanced as excuses -- regarding price distortions of commodities and negative subsidies to agriculture should be examined seriously. This is important because while the big farmers were compensating themselves through other state subsidies, the small farmers were suffering. If the feudalists are serious, they should demand an elimination of distortions. But to bring up these arguments just to avoid taxes is unjustified. The same goes for the small farmers.

The conflict between the feudalists and the merchant/industrial classes was inevitable. The feudalists are in the way of building a modern state which can serve the interests of the emerging classes. Whether the Nawaz Sharif government can take this fight to its logical end, or cave in due to political pragmatism, is yet to be seen. But the conflict will not end even if the modernistic forces are not able to prevail.

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