Case Studies in History: Algeria, 1991

Functionality.

It is not sufficient for an international political system simply to exist; it must function – it must accomplish things. Therefore, one may ask how well it functions. But this question is less straightforward than it may appear, since functionality may be defined differently by each actor. If the system is supposed to provide a secure and stable environment, then optimal functionality will include such things as the percentage of the population that enjoys physical security from the threat of criminals, terrorists, rebels, or oppressive regimes; economic well-being; a share of political power; access to justice.






However, other definitions of system functionality are possible. One’s goal might be a system of constant revolutionary renewal that promotes political activism and demands a high level of ideological awareness, in which case one might give high grades to a system that facilitates great leaps forward and cultural revolutions. One’s goal might be a system that purges foreign cultural concepts and protects traditional beliefs, in which case one might give high grades to a system that minimizes freedom of choice and controls the media. One’s goal might be a system that maintains the power of a privileged elite, in which case a system in constant turmoil that could be used to justify maintenance of a state of emergency might be given high grades. One’s goal might be preservation of the privileges enjoyed by a well-financed military, in which case one might favor the constant turmoil of a low-grade civil war that would justify such financing. One’s goal might be the preservation of a privileged military-industrial elite, in which case one might welcome a high level of international turmoil that would provide a market for the elite’s profitable arms business.

The figure,"Functionality: Moral Health of Algeria, 1991,” categorizes key acts by the regime and the opposition along two scales: a “status” scale going from low to high status and a “grouping” scale going from the act of an individual to the act of the whole population. Thus, on the vertical axis, "culture" indicates that the behavior is not only engaged in by the whole population but is accepted as "normal." If the analytical question concerns the quality of life at a given moment, then the quadrant in which behavior falls may make little difference: muggers, rebels, secret police, evil advisers, and paramilitary gangs are all lethal. But from the perspective of the system, the nature of behavior matters a great deal, and the arrow represents increasing threat to the system: the larger the percentage of the population involved and the higher the rank or the more official, the greater the threat to the system. By showing which quadrants behavior tends to fall into, the figure serves as a tool for estimating the degree to which aberrant behavior threatens the system.

Similarly, the figure can be used to evaluate the threat of and appropriate response to a dissident group (e.g., a politician with a violent following, a rebellious palace guard). To the degree that the dissident group appears to be led by low-status individuals, it fits in Quadrant A and logically should be dealt with as a police matter leading to trial. To the degree that it is supported by a mass movement, it fits in Quadrant C and will in addition require measures that address the perceptions of the population that supports it, i.e., changes in the behavior of the system that address the causes of their alienation. Misconstruing a Quadrant C situation as a problem amenable to a military solution can backfire with increasingly uncontrollable long-term consequences in a cycle of mutual violence radicalizing both sides. In sum, the figure offers a method for assessing the overall health of an international political system (or of subsystems, such as individual states) as well as for assessing the likely efficacy of a policy.



Defense.

Any system must be able to defend itself. The critical issue is in identifying the tipping point where defensive measures begin to undermine the system more than preserve it. When a political system employs irregular, informal defensive organizations that do not have legitimacy such as secret informers,[48] personal armies, lynch mobs, paramilitaries, or mercenaries, the system’s viability is called into question. Such may be the case even for completely legal defensive forces allowed to overreach a reasonable level of authority.

The critical series of events in 1991 that led to the breakdown of political order in Algeria and two decades of violence began, as shown in the two diagrams below, with the passing in April of a new electoral law to cheat the FIS (the Islamic opposition party). Banning of the use of mosques for political organizing and regime refusal to revise the electoral law followed that spring. These relatively (in comparison to what would follow) mild actions targeted at the opposition as a whole (thus falling in Quadrant C) were followed in June by a rapid and complicated series of events, notably the clearing of the streets by riot police—an act that led to violence, declaration of a state of siege, and then suddenly a notably conciliatory regime decision to compromise on elections. Track these developments graphically as they essentially follow the arrow of increasing repressiveness but then suddenly reverse direction. A few weeks later, however, the army removed Islamic slogans from the streets, followed quickly by the arrest of FIS leaders. The series of events depicted here ends in January 1992 with the regime’s canceling of National Assembly elections.








Now that this experimental analytical method has been explained, here's your quiz:

For a discussion of how to analyze political mistakes that contributed to the collapse of historical empires, see "Diagnosing Ancient Political Systems," which applies political science methodology to history.



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