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Periodic Cost of Employee Benefits



Jeremy Gold

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"truths to be self-evident"

• financial reporting: assets & liabilities at market

• no smoothing

- compensation expense = value newly earned benefit
- gains, losses, accruals of discount not compensation

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"not so evident"

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• what is the liability?

- candidates
 - VBO -- vested benefit obligation
 - ABO accumulated benefit obligation
 - PBO projected benefit obligation

what do we find?

- 1 accounting matches economics?
 e.g., DC plans
- 2 accounting can be fixed?
 e.g., exit-cost for DB plans
- 3 benefit design is broken?
 e.g., health care cliff vesting at 55

candidates

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• PBO versus ABO/VBO

• ABO versus VBO

- why did FASB choose the PBO for pay-related plans?
 - plan benefit depends on future rates of pay
 - measuring value of 1% of (final) pay
 - there is a difference: ongoing & terminating plan
 - difference between 1% of final pay 1% of each year's pay
 - actuarial best estimate having estimated mean pay increases, gains and losses are expected to be zero

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- what's wrong with those arguments?
 - theory
 - we do not account for future compensation on PBO basis
 - no explicit contract for future pay increase
 - competition implies less difference between final and career average
 - practice
 - charging the PBO (advance recognition) invites employer to capture the (PBO - ABO) when times are tough - CB conversions, plan terminations, etc.

- case against smoothing and advance recognition
 - dc plans always use exit costing
 - suppose we advance recognize & smooth this dc plan:
 - plan credits \$1000/year years 1 5
 - \$3000/year years 6 -
 - charge \$2000/year every year (charge reduces direct pay)

- Smith (total compensation \$50k)
 - sees self as long service accepts job
 - gets \$48k & \$1k in plan for five years

- case against smoothing and advance recognition
 - company is taken over

lesson:

- good news: same plan Smith gets \$3k contribution
- bad news: exit cost accounting (normal for dc plans)
 - Smith direct pay drops to \$47k, \$5k gone for naught
 - victim of advance recognition

- with exit costing from t=0, Smith is immune
- yet such advance recognition normal for db plans

• PBO — needs implicit contract to justify advance recognition

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• VBO follows explicit contract - no advance recognition

- ABO requires implicit contract
 - for continued employment only, not for pay increases
- can we split that hair?
- ABO same potential moral hazard as PBO
 - may be de minimis for a five-year cliff
 - what about subsidized early retirement?
 - what about post-employment health care?
 - let's look at examples:

- five-year cliff for defined benefit pension
 - de minimis? Yes
 - an implicit contract? Probably
 - does contract justify accounting or accounting create the contract?
- the implicit contract:
 - say vested benefit value = \$1000
 - employee accepts probability of vesting is, say, 50%
 - because she is risk averse, accepts only \$400 charge against her pay
 - costly to employer (\$100) compared to fully vested plan
 - may be justified by contract's retention power
 - allows training that may increase employee productivity.

- the implicit contract (continued):
 - with potential loss if she leaves before vested
 - employee is more likely to stay
 - may accept smaller pay increase in years 3 and 4
 - raises her asking price for competitive employment
 - employee is at some risk of being fired before vesting
 - she is less likely to shirk
 - employer cannot afford to get a reputation for firing non-shirking employees and so honors the implicit contract

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• can we justify the ABO treatment?

- age 55 cliff for subsidized early & post-employment health
 - de minimis? No
 - an implicit contract? Probably, but not like FAS 87/106
 - does contract justify accounting or accounting create the contract?
- the implicit contract:
 - nothing substantive before age 45 or so
 - implicit contract allows reduced pay in contemplation of magnet
 - magnet holds employee
 - at 55, big increase in employee wealth
 - after 55, pension/health care asset is wasting, encourages exit

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- the implicit contract (continued):
 - a form of Lazear style implicit contract to retain, motivate and sever
 - employer cannot afford to get a reputation for firing non-shirking employees and so honors the implicit contract
 - but too many examples of partial/full reneging
- can we justify the VBO treatment?
 - would immunize employee against firm reneging
 - would require impossible charge against pay at age 55
 - would fail to apprise shareholders of "looming" liability
 - might focus on poorly designed benefits (e.g. risk-creating vesting)

- can we justify the ABO treatment?
 - solves the last 2 VBO problems
 - endangers employees
 - charges young hires, their risk charge costly to employers
 - hides poor designs
- can we design a better explicit contract?
 - graded vesting to mitigate ABO/VBO conflict
 - VBO, no charge before vesting begins
 - for DB, eliminate or vest the early retirement subsidy and/or CB

- use window plans to encourage severance

• VBO protects against moral hazard

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- ABO better informs shareholders in re: "looming liabilities"
- cliff vesting is fragile creates looming liabilities
- revocable benefits are fragile invite moral hazard and bad reporting

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