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The Shield - Volume XX, No. 3 - July-September
2003
(IN PRODUCTION)
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The Shield - Volume XX, No.
2 - April-June 2003
Missile Defense Prospects In The Changing World
Scene!
White House BMD Policy
North Korea: Arms Control Folly
Defensible
War Crimes Collision
|
The Shield - Volume XX,
No. 1 - January-March 2003
On To Winning One For The Gipper!
The Right Call On Missile Defense
The Old Dominion Speaks!
Pyongyang's Nuclear Blackmail
Potpourri
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The Shield - Volume XIX,
No. 4 - October-December 2002
Taking Stock of 2002
CIA Director Says al Qaeda Still A Major Threat
North Korea Sells Scuds To Yemen
North Korea's Global Threat
Lessons From The Past on Space-Based Interceptors
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The Shield - Volume XIX, No. 3
- July-September 2002
Overcoming Bureaucratic Inertia and Collective
Amnesia
An Urgent Homeland Security Requirement
CIA Assessment of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction
Programs
Worries About Russia
Eyes Wide Shut
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The Shield - Volume XIX, No. 2 - April-June
2002
Free At Last!
Moscow Summit Excerpts
Another Navy Hit
In Self Defense
The Root Cause of Terrorism
New National Security Ways
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| The Shield - Volume XIX, No. 1 - January-March
2002
At Long Last: Poised To End America's Vulnerability!
Putin, Bush May Sign Two Arms Deals At May Summit
New Hampshire House Resolution
Countdown For Sea and Space-Based Defenses?
ABM Systems and the Outer Space Treaty
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The Shield - Volume XVIII, No. 6- November/December
2001
Free At Last, Free At Last; Let’s Roll!!!
New Hampshire Resolution
Words For The History Books by President
George W. Bush
Missile Defense's Feminine Mystique
Urgent Call For Help
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| The Shield- Volume XVIII, No. 5- September/October
2001
Read The Fine Print And Watch What They Do!!!
A 'Prophet' Finds Honor At Last
The Coalition Trap
Remarks from Senator Jesse Helms
To Do Iraq or Not Do Iraq – That's the Question
for Dubya
Potpourri
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The Shield- Volume XVIII, No. 4- July/August
2001
Good News, Bad News on Missile Defense Prospects
Rempt: "No Showstoppers" To Building Sea-Based
Global Missile Defense
Missile Defense: Unprepared For Manifest Peril
Stop The MADness: The Case For Missile Defense
Weldon Proposes U.S.-Israeli-Turkey Cooperation
On Boost-Phase Defense
Kozyrev: NMD System Offers Russia Hope
Missile Defense Advocate: DoD Approach Too Narrow
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The Shield- Volume XVIII, No. 3- May/June 2001
The Month That Was
When will America respond
to China's space challenge?
Reagan’s Science Advisor
Speaks Out For A Global Defense
Pssst.. The ABM Treaty is dead!!
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The Shield- Volume XVIII, No. 2- March/April
2001
Poised To End
America's Vulnerability!
Self-Deterred
From Defending the U.S.?
An Urgent Threat
Does Russia
Already Have A National Missile Defense?
Cooperation With Russia?
Space: Battlefield
Of The Future?
Final Thoughts
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The Shield- Volume XVIII,
No. 1- January/February 2001
A New Old Wind Blowing!
Capitol Hill Support for Building Defenses
British Conservatives Back Bush on Missile Defense
Proposed Bush Missile Defense Agenda Rumsfeld II
Happy Gulf War Anniversary!
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The Shield- Volume XVII,
No. 6- November/December 2000
Defense in the Balance!!!
Trying to Ban Space Weapons
Potpourri
Front and Center
Happy Holidays
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| The Shield- Volume XVII,
No. 5- September/October 2000 |
The Shield- Volume XVII,
No. 4- July/ August 2000
An Expensive "No-Test" - And Consequences
Missile Defense Isn't Rocket Science
Missile Defense Triumph
Bush on Missile Defense
Go Navy!
"FRONT AND CENTER"
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The Shield- Volume XVII,
No. 3- May/June 2000
Shocked, Shocked at NMD Cost Growth!
A New Coalition to Protect Americans Now!
First By Sea
Time for Missile Defense
Anti-Missile Defense Chorus
Naval NMD Role?
Generally Speaking: Getting the Word Out!
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The Shield- Volume XVII,
No. 2- March/April 2000
Coming Out for Sea Based Defense
November Missile Defense
Missiles and Gnashing Teeth
Fiscal Year 2001 Defense Budget
Missile Defense Hearing Introduction
Radio Audience to Double
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What
a kaleidoscope of world events we have seen in the past several months!
Against the back-ground of anticipation for, the conduct of, and the aftermath
since the second Gulf War, the May 20 White House announcement of the President’s
missile defense policy (Page 3) was hardly noticed.
There was all the brouhaha associated with the Russians,
French, Germans and other lights of the United Nations and “old Europe” (as
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld called them), who opposed actions to go into Iraq
by the U.S. and “its coalition of the willing” – and then after the primary
conflict ended ~3 weeks later claimed that “only the UN has the legitimacy”
to restore a political, economic, and social system in Iraq.
An April 15 Washington Times Editorial tartly observed
that, in its role as promoter of international security and safety, the UN
“demon-strated itself to be a dysfunctional, counterproductive organization
that must be radically reformed.” And a number of our Europeans “allies”
have been scrambling to paper over their sharp differences with the U.S.
in the lead-up to the war – and its aftermath as well.
Not the least of the recent unpleasantness was Belgium’s
formal effort to prosecute for war crimes the likes of President Bush and
Gen. Tommy Franks. Phyllis Schlafly recounts aspects of this sorry scene
in her article reprinted on page 7. Secretary Rumsfeld made clear the U.S.
would not contribute to a new NATO head-quarters in Brussels unless Belgium
repeals this offensive law.
After President declared the war over, we learned of Saddam
Hussein’s massive slaughter of Iraqis – and that the chief news executive
of CNN knew of this fact for years but did not inform the public in order
to keep its Baghdad Bureau open and, in what some characterized as “a straight
propaganda-for-profits deal with Saddam,” broadcasting a false image of the
state of affairs in Iraq.
Although President Bush declared victory 3 months ago,
the U.S. casualties continue to mount –since the end of war reaching almost
a third of those during the 3 week war. As 2004 presidential politics begins
to heat up, so is an unsavory “blame game” of rhetoric about whether President
Bush misled the American people about Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction
(WMD).
Never mind that there was and is no disagreement about
whether Saddam was defying the international community in refusing to disclose
and dismantle his WMD.
For example, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) and several other
senators wrote then President Bill Clinton in 1998 stating, “[W]e urge you
. . . to take necessary actions (including, if appropriate, air and missile
strikes on suspect Iraq sites) to respond effect-ively to the threat posed
by Iraq’s refusal to end its weapons of mass destruction programs.” As late
as on September 19, 2002, Senator Levin stated in a Senate Armed Services
Committee Hearing, “Since Saddam Hussein refuses to comply with the UN resolutions,
I support the use of military force either to compel compliance or to destroy,
to the best of our ability, Iraq’s capability to build and deliver weapons
of mass destruction and threaten its neighbors.”
But now Senator Levin, among others, accuses the President
and his administration of “shading the intelligence” and exaggerating the
threat. Could there be a bit of political motivation here? You bet!
There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein had WMD – the right
question is “What did he do with his WMD?” In due time, we will find his
WMD – but recall that after the first Gulf War, our intelligence commun-ity
was surprised to learn of his massive establishment with 20,000 scientists
and engineers working to develop nuclear weapons. And with the most intrusive
inspections ever conducted, we only found Iraq’s substantial biological weapons
pro-gram after four years of searching – and then after Saddam’s son-in-law
told us where to look.
And as the Bush administration attempts to get the Iraqi
political situation under control, the dangers grow elsewhere; e.g., with
North Korea and Iran – both nations appear to be developing nuclear weapons.
As we prepared for war with Iraq, North Korea told us they were preparing
to produce weapons grade uranium to make more nuclear weapons. (We believe
they already have a couple.) So now, we are trying to get them to stop
– see Bob Bartley’s excellent article, page 4.
Iran also seems poised to get nuclear weapons – with Russia’s
help. As President Bush stated on June 18, "The international community must
come together to make it very clear to Iran that we will not tolerate construction
of a nuclear weapon. Iran would be dangerous if they have a nuclear weapon."
Hopefully, President Bush’s erst-while friend, Russian President Vladimir
Putin, will at long last assure that Russia ceases and desists selling key
enabling nuclear weapons related technology to Iran.
Don’t hold your breath!
And so, what has been happening on the missile defense
front? It is hard to improve on President Bush’s consistent leadership in
eliminating the ABM Treaty barrier, calling for effective defenses as quickly
as possible, and last December directing ground- and sea-based defenses be
deployed as early as in 2004. The White House missile defense policy is summarized,
beginning on page 3.
Now let’s turn to the Pentagon. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld
has delivered the largest budget for missile defense ever – over twice the
highest achieved during the Reagan-Bush I years. Regrettably, how this money
is being invested leaves much to be desired.
In the first place, most of the money is being spent on
moving ahead with an expensive ground-based, mid-course defense designed
by the Clinton administration more to be consistent with the ABM Treaty than
to be an effective defense – and modified only at the margins by the Bush
administration.
Second, in spite of the President’s direction to build
a sea-based defense by 2004, the Pentagon’s plan is not funded to deliver
on that time frame – it is explicitly directed at late 2005, even though
2004 might possibly be achieved for as little as $50-100 million more than
currently programmed; and within the same budget it could be given the ability
to protect American cities as well as our overseas troops, friends and allies.
(The recent test failure – discussed on page 6 – does not change this possibility.)
And for $50 million, the Navy could modify its standard missile air defense
system within nine months to provide an early boost-phase defense against
SCUDs that might be launched from ships off our coasts at American cities
today. The powers that be should find $150 million out of the $9 billion
being spent this year on missile defense to get sea-based defenses on station
in 2004. No-brainer!
Third, essentially nothing has been done to revive the
most effective technology and defense concept produced by the Reagan-Bush
I Strategic Defense Initiative – associated with the space-based interceptor
system called Brilliant Pebbles. This incredible fact was perhaps explained
by Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough in their May 23rd Washington Times
commentary, “Inside the Ring.” They quoted Terry Little, selected by MDA
Director Lt. Gen. Ron Kadish to manage the Pentagon’s very important boost-phase
intercept program, declare to a meeting of missile-defense specialists: “I’m
proud to be a liberal Democrat.” This goes a long way to explaining reports
that Mr. Little has been active in blocking work on space-based defenses,
even though President Bush’s recently signed directive calls for “development
and testing” of such defenses.”
Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) made very clear
that blocking any serious effort to build space-based defense is a Democrat
priority when he said on May 8, “I think putting weapons in space may be
the single dumbest thing I've heard so far from this administration. It would
be a disaster for us to put weapons in space of any kind under any circum-stances.
I think Democrats will be universally opposed to doing something as foolish
as that.”
Although the Missile Defense Agency is not an advocate
for space-based defenses – or even exploiting still cutting edge decade old
space technology for other basing modes, the Air Force seems to understand
the importance of moving ahead with “weapons in space” for both offensive
and defensive purposes.
At a recent hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Peter Teets, Air Force Undersecretary and Director of the National Reconnaissance
Office, called for revising the U.S. policy banning weapons in space. He
said the military policy on space weapons is being reviewed and “could conceivably
change” so that space weapons can be used to defend the hundreds of satellites
used for spying, communications and warning. And he added, “But I,
for one, believe that the time has come for us to consider a change in policy
which would allow us to have some offensive capability as well.”
Later before the same subcommittee, Air Force Gen. Lance
Lord, commander of Air Force Space Command, said "offensive counter-space"
arms are needed because space attacks are inevitable. "I think it's not a
matter of if, it's when somebody is going to try to perturb our asymmetric
advantage in space," Gen. Lord said.
Twenty years ago, about 250 satellites, three-quarters
of them owned by governments, were orbiting the Earth. Today, about 1,000
satellites are in orbit and half are owned by governments. And U.S. defense
officials have said Russia and China are developing lasers and other weapons
that can attack satellites.
At least someone is thinking about exploiting America’s
best technology to protect us in and from space. Maybe the missile
defense powers that be will eventually wake up and revive Ronald Reagan’s
vision and the most important program produced by his SDI program. Stay tuned!
Restructuring our defense and
deterrence capabilities to correspond to emerging threats remains one of
the Administration's highest priorities, and the deployment of missile defenses
is an essential component of this broader effort.
Changed Security Environment
As the events of September 11 demonstrated, the security
environment is more complex and less predictable than in the past. We face
growing threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of states
or non-state actors, threats that range from terrorism to ballistic missiles
intended to intimidate and coerce us by holding the U.S. and our friends
and allies hostage to WMD attack.
Hostile states, including those that sponsor terrorism,
are investing large resources to develop and acquire ballistic missiles of
increasing range and sophistication that could be used against the United
States and our friends and allies. These same states have chemical, biological,
and/or nuclear weapons programs. In fact, one of the factors that make long-range
ballistic missiles attractive as a delivery vehicle for weapons of mass destruction
is that the United States and our allies lack effective defenses against
this threat.
The contemporary and emerging missile threat from hostile
states is fundamentally different from that of the Cold War and requires
a different approach to deterrence and new tools for defense. The strategic
logic of the past may not apply to these new threats, and we cannot be wholly
dependent on our capability to deter them. Compared to the Soviet Union,
their leaderships often are more risk prone. These are leaders that also
see WMD as weapons of choice, not of last resort. Weapons of mass destruction
are their most lethal means to compensate for our conventional strength and
to allow them to pursue their objectives through force, coercion, and intimidation.
Deterring these threats will be difficult. There are no
mutual understandings or reliable lines of communication with these states.
Our new adversaries seek to keep us out of their region, leaving them free
to support terrorism and to pursue aggression against their neighbors. By
their own calculations, these leaders may believe they can do this by holding
a few of our cities hos-tage. Our adver-saries seek enough destructive capability
to blackmail us from coming to the assistance of our friends who would then
become the victims of aggression.
Some states are aggressively pursuing the development
of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles as a means of coercing
the United States and our allies. To deter such threats, we must devalue
missiles as tools of extortion and aggression, undermining the confidence
of our adversaries that threatening a missile attack would succeed in blackmailing
us. In this way, although missile defenses are not a replacement for an offensive
response capability, they are an added and critical dimension of contemporary
deterrence. Missile defenses will also help to assure allies and friends,
and to dissuade countries from pursuing ballistic missiles in the first instance
by undermining their military utility.
National Missile Defense Act of 1999
On July 22, 1999, the National Missile Defense Act of
1999 (Public Law 106-38) was signed into law. This law states, "It is the
policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible
an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory
of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental,
unauthorized, or deliberate) with funding subject to the annual authorization
of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for National Missile
Defense." The Administration's program on missile defense is fully consistent
with this policy.
Missile Defense Program
At the outset of this Administration, the President directed
his Administration to examine the full range of available technologies and
basing modes for missile defenses that could protect the United States, our
deployed forces, and our friends and allies. Our policy is to develop and
deploy, at the earliest possible date, ballistic missile defenses drawing
on the best technologies available.
The Administration has also eliminated the artificial
distinction between "national" and "theater" missile defenses.
The defenses we will develop and deploy must be capable
of not only defending the United States and our deployed forces, but also
friends and allies; The distinction between theater and national defenses
was largely a product of the ABM Treaty and is outmoded. For example, some
of the systems we are pursuing, such as boost-phase defenses, are inherently
capable of intercepting missiles of all ranges, blurring the distinction
between theater and national defenses; and The terms "theater" and "national"
are interchangeable depending on the circumstances, and thus are not a meaningful
means of categorizing missile defenses. For example, some of the systems
being pursued by the United States to protect deployed forces are capable
of defending the entire national territory of some friends and allies, thereby
meeting the definition of a "national" missile defense system.
Building on previous missile defense work, over the past
year and a half, the Defense Department has pursued a robust research, development,
testing, and evaluation program designed to develop layered defenses capable
of intercepting missiles of varying ranges in all phases of flight. The testing
regimen employed has become increasingly stressing, and the results of recent
tests have been impressive.
Fielding Missile Defenses
In light of the changed security environment and progress
made to date in our development efforts, the United States plans to begin
deployment of a set of missile defense capabilities in 2004. These capabilities
will serve as a starting point for fielding improved and expanded missile
defense capabilities later.
We are pursuing an evolutionary approach to the development
and deployment of missile defenses to improve our defenses over time. The
United States will not have a final, fixed missile defense architecture.
Rather, we will deploy an initial set of capabilities that will evolve to
meet the changing threat and to take advantage of technological developments.
The composition of missile defenses, to include the number and location of
systems deployed, will change over time.
In August 2002, the Administration proposed an evolutionary
way ahead for the deployment of missile defenses. The capabilities planned
for operational use in 2004 and 2005 will include ground-based interceptors,
sea-based interceptors, additional Patriot (PAC-3) units, and sensors based
on land, at sea, and in space. In addition, the United States will work with
allies to upgrade key early-warning radars as part of our capabilities.
Under our approach, these capabilities may be improved
through additional measures such as:
Deployment of additional ground- and sea-based interceptors,
and Patriot (PAC-3) units; Initial deployment of the THAAD and Airborne Laser
systems; Development of a family of boost-phase and midcourse hit-to-kill
interceptors based on sea-, air-, and ground-based platforms; Enhanced sensor
capabilities; and Development and testing of space-based defenses.
The Defense Department will begin to implement this approach
and will move forward with plans to deploy a set of initial missile defense
capabilities beginning in 2004.
Cooperation with Friends and Allies
Because the threats of the 21st century also endanger
our friends and allies around the world, it is essential that we work together
to defend against these threats. Missile defense cooperation will be a feature
of U.S. relations with close, long-standing allies, and an important means
to build new relationships with new friends like Russia. Consistent with
these goals:
The U.S. will develop and deploy missile defenses capable
of protecting not only the United States and our deployed forces, but also
friends and allies; We will also structure the missile defense program in
a manner that encourages industrial participation by friends and allies,
consistent with overall U.S. national security; and We will also promote
international missile defense cooperation, including within bilateral and
alliance structures such as NATO.
As part of our efforts to deepen missile defense cooperation
with friends and allies, the United States will seek to eliminate impediments
to such cooperation. We will review existing policies and practices governing
technology sharing and cooperation on missile defense, including U.S. export
control regulations and statutes, with this aim in mind.
The goal of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
is to help reduce the global missile threat by curbing the flow of missiles
and related technology to proliferators. The MTCR and missile defenses play
complementary roles in countering the global missile threat. The United States
intends to implement the MTCR in a manner that does not impede missile defense
cooperation with friends and allies.
Conclusion
The new strategic challenges of the 21st century require us to think differently,
but they also require us to act. The deployment of effective missile defenses
is an essential element of the United States' broader efforts to transform
our defense and deterrence policies and capabilities to meet the new threats
we face. Defending the American people against these new threats is the Administration's
highest priority.
North Korea: Arms Control Folly
By Robert L. Bartley
So North Korea cements its standing as a member of the
Axis of Evil by boasting that it already has nuclear weapons and hinting
it might use them. No one proposes to meet this threat by invading forthwith,
but no one has any other good answer either. At least we can understand how
we got into this fix; it's a tale of extraordinary folly.
Under Kim Jong Il, ("Dear Leader"), son of Kim Il Sung,
("Great Leader"), North Korea is the last vestige of the Stalinist state.
Its regimented citizens are chronically malnourished, and it averted mass
starvation in 1995-96 through massive international food aid. Yet it spends
more than 30% of its economic output on military expenditures, maintaining
a million men under arms in a nation of 22 million.
The only conceivable purpose of this crazed posture is
to refight the Korean War. Thousands of artillery tubes in caves along the
South Korean border threaten the South Korean capital of Seoul, a city of
some 20 million civilians. Some estimate that 60% of the shells in the first
salvo would be chemical. Meanwhile Kim seeks nuclear weapons to deter the
United States.
The Reagan administration solved the North Korean nuclear problem for the
first time back in 1985, persuad-ing them to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), with inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). However, North Korea said its adherence to the agreements was contingent
on the remov-al of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea.
So in 1991, President George H.W. Bush solved the North
Korean nuclear problem a second time, announcing that the U.S. would withdraw
all tactical nuclear weapons abroad, including 100 or so in Korea. This may
have made military sense because of improved conventional weapons, and allowed
the two Koreas to ratify that the problem was solved through a bilateral
agreement not to test, store or deploy nuclear weapons.
In 1992, North Korea concluded its agreement with the
IAEA, declared seven nuclear sites and some plutonium open for inspection.
So the problem was solved, except that the IAEA discovered discrepancies
in the report and demanded special inspections of two nuclear waste storage
sites. In response, the North Koreans announced their intention to withdraw
from the NPT.
So in 1993, the Clinton administration solved the problem
a third time, persuading the North Koreans to "suspend" their withdrawal
and submit to inspections. However, the CIA estimated that North Korea may
have produced one or two nuclear weapons. When IAEA inspectors arrived, the
North Koreans refused to allow them to inspect the plutonium reprocessing
plant at Yongbyon and announced that it was withdrawing from the NPT after
all.
So in 1994, former President Jimmy Carter showed up to
solve the problem a fourth time, charming the North Koreans into confirming
their willingness to freeze nuclear development and hold more talks.
Later that year, Clinton administration negotiators solved
the problem a fifth time with the "Agreed Framework." North Korea agreed
to drop proposed nuclear reactors, in exchange for two "light-water" reactors
designed by the U.S. and built by an international consortium. Pending their
completion, North Korea would get fuel oil shipments.
In 1999, the Clinton administration solved the problem
a sixth time by inspecting the Kumchang-ni site, where the U.S. suspected
underground nuclear facilities. In exchange for food aid the Koreans allowed
inspections, after five months during which spy satellites showed them moving
things away. The inspection found no nuclear activity, so the problem was
solved again.
The "Agreed Framework" incorporated the brainstorm of
installing cameras to monitor the plutonium stored in North Korea.
Last December, the Koreans blandly turned off the cameras.
Having played the chess game into this impasse, the arms
control crowd is now demanding of the Bush administration: OK, what are you
going to do next? In this view, the problem is that the administration's
candor has upset the fiction that the problem has been solved.
Such peaceful solutions as may exist lead through China.
The North Korean regime exists at its economic sufferance, and if Kim pursues
nuclear ambitions China will likely face a nuclear Japan and Taiwan. China
recently did briefly interrupt oil shipments to North Korea, but also blocked
a U.N. Security Council statement on the issue.
So the Bush administration has to be considering what
it can do on its own. The bedrock is deterrence, which after all worked during
the Cold War. The administration should make unmistakably clear that if North
Korea uses nuclear weapons or attacks Seoul, its regime will be obliterated;
this may not require but should not exclude nuclear weapons.
The second alternative is interdiction. While North Korea
certainly has been guilty of terrorism in the past, it has no terrorist ally
like al Qaeda. The danger is that it will peddle nuclear weapons to terrorists
around the world. The U.S. and Spain cooperated in stopping and searching
a North Korean ship with missiles for Yemen, and only last week the Australians
boarded another ship apparently smuggling drugs, another source of Kim's
foreign cash. These efforts should be regularized, under the rubric of preemptive
self-defense if international lawyers find that necessary.
The third essential is missile defense. North Korea has
tested a missile that overshot Japan and landed near U.S. territory in the
Aleutians. A seaborne antimissile sys-tem stationed off the Korean coasts
could, conceptually at least, intercept such launches in the vulnerable boost
stage.
What will not work is to solve the problem once again
with another arms control agreement. The record shows that arms control is
not a solution; its pretenses are a large part of the problem.
Published in the Wall Street Journal on April 28, 2003 – reprinted with
permission.
“With respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction . .
. no issue is of greater urgency to us than North Korea’s nuclear weapons
program. This is not a bilateral matter between the United States and
North Korea. It affects every nation in the region that would fall under
the arc of a North Korean missile.”
Secretary of State Colin Powell, June 18, 2003
On June 18, the Missile Defense
Agency and the Navy conducted the fourth test of the Aegis-based SM-3 missile
in a ballistic missile defense intercept mode. While the booster worked
fine and dispatched its “kill vehicle” – which stabilized, acquired and tracked
its target, and moved on an intercept course. Then, one new element being
tested for the first time failed to operate properly and the kill vehicle
missed its target. After three unqualified successful SM-3 tests in
a row, it is disappointing that number four was not a complete success.
But it is not surprising that such failures occur during a rigorous test
program – and often the engineers learn more from failure than from success.
This is just one of the bumps along the road to building an effective defense.
But there are always those who wish to make much of test
failures – they seem to forget the numerous test failures on the way to developing
numerous very successful and very reliable systems. This experience
was no exception – and the critics of missile defense are out in force attempting
to make much of this temporary setback in a program that could provide a
sea-based capability as early as next year if it is fully funded and the
engineers successfully press ahead with their efforts. Not the least of these
was Fred Kaplan, a notable and consistent critic of what he has called “missile
defense madness.” Writing in Slate, Kaplan ridiculed Pentagon spokesmen who
indicated that the test was a partial success – arguing, in effect, that
if every new thing doesn’t work the first time, everything is a failure.
Mr. John J. Miller, writing in National Review Online effectively took Mr.
Kaplan to task for his obviously prejudiced critique.
The fact is that if future testing goes well, this sea-based
defense could be extended to achieve an ability to defend the U.S. against
long-range ballistic missiles in addition to defending the fleet and our
overseas troops, friends and allies against short-, and medium-range missiles.
And with the needed funding support this could happen next year.
Defensible
John J. Miller
How missile defense can learn from failure.
I have a theory about the enemies of missile defense.
Whenever one of the Pentagon's ABM tests doesn't go according to plan, they
give a prize to the first one who shouts "nanny-nanny-boo-boo!" in the popular
press.
The most recent winner may be Fred Kaplan, for this article
in Slate. It was certainly the most mocking assessment of an Aegis missile-defense
test that went awry last week. The headline said it all: "The Pentagon's
Laughable Weapons Test."
Let's set aside the question of why missile-defense critics
are so happy when military technology that means to protect us from weapons
of mass destruction doesn't live up to its promise. For now, we'll focus
on Kaplan's gleeful outrage over how the Missile Defense Agency described
what happened — and in particular, its reluctance to label the test a "failure."
Indeed, the MDA's press release oddly resorts to the passive
voice in describing the test: "an intercept was not achieved." I have no
idea why the agency doesn't just say the thing "missed its target."
But this is a minor point of semantics. Kaplan wants to
make a major issue of missile-defense failure. He quotes MDA spokesman Chris
Taylor: "I wouldn't call it a failure," said Taylor on CNN, "because the
intercept was not the primary objective. It's still considered a success,
in that we gained great engineering data. We just don't know why it didn't
hit."
Kaplan sneers: "Oh, it's hard to be a satirist these days."
This is grossly unfair, and Kaplan knows it. Taylor's
point is a rather simple one: Just as a test in school can have dozens of
questions, a missile-defense test has many parts. The ABM may have missed
its target, but that doesn't mean nobody will learn anything from what happened.
Researches will study how the rocket motors and directional thrusters performed,
whether the radars and heat seeker picked up its prey, and so on. We may
soon know precisely why the interceptor missed its target. Then we'll be
able to fix the problem and move on. If nobody ever learned from failure
— I'll go ahead and use the word, even if Taylor avoids it — we wouldn't
bother to figure out why the Columbia Space Shuttle disintegrated in February.
It's disappointing that the Aegis system didn't operate
as well as we might have hoped. In a way, it's even more disappointing to
hear the cackles of Kaplan and others echoing in the background. These guys
seem like modern-day Luddites, judging from their delight at technology letting
us down.
At least Kaplan is honest enough to write these words
in his last paragraph: "Of course, the Pentagon's standard of success in
testing is not entirely ridiculous. In the early stages of a weapon's R &
D, especially if the program involves advanced technology, there is real
value in learning practically anything about its performance. If one part
of the test fails but the other parts work fine, it might legitimately be
called a success."
Those three sentences almost retract the snickers that
come before them. Yet Kaplan just couldn't hold his fire — or keep himself
from giggling — at last week's test.
Maybe we supporters of missile defense should set up our
own awards program. The first critic to emit joyful howls at a missile-defense
setback wins a framed map of Los Angeles with a big red bull's-eye drawn
on it.
Writing in National Review On-Line, June 23, 2003 – http://www.nationalreview.com/miller/miller062303.
Should the United States
permit Gen. Tommy R. Franks, head of the U.S. Central Command, to be prosecuted
in a court in Belgium for alleged war crimes committed during the Iraq war?
Most Americans would say, you have to be kidding; that could never happen.
But little Belgium, trying to be a player on the world
stage, has adopted what it calls a universal-jurisdiction law. It purports
to give Belgium jurisdiction over war crimes committed anywhere in the world
and give Belgian judges the authority to hear complaints brought by anyone.
Already on file are complaints not only against Gen. Franks,
but also against former President Bush, retired Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf,
Secretary of State Colin Powell and Vice President Richard Cheney, for alleged
war crimes against civilians when they bombed a Baghdad bunker during the
first Gulf War; and against both Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and
Yasser Arafat.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld properly and publicly
lowered the boom on uppity Belgium last week. He said the United States will
provide no funds for the new NATO headquarters unless Belgium repeals this
law.
Brussels has been host to NATO since 1967. NATO (which
has long since completed its genuine mission of keeping Soviet troops out
of Western Europe) is now kept on life support in order to continue channeling
U.S. taxpayer funds to Europe.
NATO is planning to pretend it has a reason for existence
by building a $352.4 million futuristic headquarters in Belgium. U.S. taxpayers
are expected to pony up at least 22 percent of the cost.
In Brussels last week, Mr. Rumsfeld said, "If the civilian
and military leaders of member states cannot come to Belgium without fear
of harassment by Belgian courts enforcing spurious charges by political prosecutors,
then it calls into question Belgium's attitude about its responsibilities
as a host nation."
Mr. Rumsfeld said the Belgian law "has turned its legal
system into a platform for divisive politicized lawsuits against her NATO
allies." He added that it doesn't make sense for the U.S. to build a headquarters
in Belgium if U.S. officials can't come to Belgium without fear of being
arrested, and "I've just stated a fact."
Meanwhile, the Netherlands is trying to move to the center
of the world stage with the International Criminal Court (ICC), headquartered
in The Hague. The ICC bureaucrats, who are pseudo judges pretentiously asserting
the power to enforce pseudo law, assert jurisdiction over U.S. citizens even
though we are not now and never will be a party to the treaty and no international
law can bind a country that didn't sign a treaty consenting to be bound by
it.
One of President Clinton's last official acts was his
New Year's Eve signing of the International Criminal Court Treaty, but it
was never ratified by our Senate. President George W. Bush courageously stood
up for American sovereignty when he took the unprecedented step of "unsigning"
the treaty.
Last year, the United Nations Security Council reluctantly
deigned to grant the United States a one-year grace period from the risk
of having U.S. soldiers on overseas peacekeeping missions arrested for prosecution
by the ICC. Our so-called allies were worried that they would have to take
over the costs of peacekeeping in Bosnia if U.S. troops pulled out.
The Bush administration has been trying to cajole separate
nations into signing promises that they won't arrest Americans stationed
on their territory. So far, 38 such agreements have been signed, but that
doesn't include most of the major governments.
The one-year exemption granted by the U.N. last year just
expired, and the U.N. Security Council reluctantly approved a one-year extension.
France, Germany and Syria abstained, 17 countries spoke
out against us, and U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan undiplomatically sneered
at the U.S. exemption.
Our so-called European allies, whom American blood and
treasure have again and again protected against military aggression and economic
ruin, deserve a prize for impertinence. We should nip in the bud the heady
hopes of the pompous bureaucrats in The Hague and Brussels, who were not
elected by anybody yet dream they can exercise global judicial power.
U.S. officials don't need to pussyfoot around with the
niceties of diplomatic language. They should say: "Bug off. America already
enjoys the rule of law that best protects human rights; our Bill of Rights
is not up for negotiation with foreigners; and we will not subject our citizens
to rules or judges in foreign countries."
Fortunately, we have moved on from the era of President
Clinton, who told the United Nations in 1997 that he wanted to put the United
States into a "web of institutions" to set "the international ground rules
for the 21st century." We now have a president who will stand up for American
sovereignty.
Phyllis Schlafly, a nationally syndicated columnist, published this
article in the Washington Times on June 18, 2003, reprinted with permission.
“I have become more and more deeply convinced
that the human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with other nations
and human beings by threatening their existence. . . . One of the most important
contributions we can make is, of course, to lower the level of arms. . .
. If the Soviet Union will join us, we will have succeeded in stabilizing
the nuclear balance. Nevertheless, it will still be necessary to rely
on the spectre of retaliation, or mutual threat. And that is a sad
commentary on the human condition.
“Wouldn’t it be better to save lives than to avenge them? Are we not
capable of demonstrating our peaceful intention by applying all our abilities
and ingenuity to achieving a truly lasting stability?
“I think we are. Indeed we must. . . . Let me share with you a vision
of the future which offers hope. It is that we embrace a program to
counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive.
. . . What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security
did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter Soviet attack,
that we could intercept and destroy ballistic missiles before they reached
our soil or that of our allies?
“I know this is a formidable task, one that may not be accomplished before
the end of this century. Yet, current technology has attained a level
of sophistication where it is reasonable for us to begin this effort. . .
. Isn’t it worth every investment necessary to free the world from the threat
of nuclear war?
“. . . My fellow Americans, tonight we’re launching an effort which holds
the promise of changing the course of human history. There are risks,
and results will take time. But I believe we can do it.”
President Ronald Reagan, March 23, 1983
Ronald Reagan had it right. His Strategic Defense
Initiative showed that the technology was capable of ending America’s vulnerability
to even a single ballistic missile. As the first Bush administration
ended, SDI technology was ready to be fielded; but the Clinton team killed
the most advanced programs – by “taking the stars out of Star Wars,” as Defense
Secretary Les Aspin derisively boasted. The Clinton years were spent
“strengthening the ABM Treaty” that blocked even the testing of the most effective
defense concepts.
Happily, those days are over. On December 13, 2001,
President George W. Bush gave Russia six months notice that the United States
would withdraw from the ABM Treaty. He was true to his word – and on
June 13, 2002, America was free for the first time in 30 years to employ its
best technology to defend the American people from ballistic missile attack.
Finally, American engineers and scientists are free to press toward the
vision, stated 20 years ago by President Ronald Reagan – to end America’s
vulnerability to even a single ballistic missile and hopefully to leave the
Cold War’s Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine in the ash bin of History
along with the Soviet Union. After 30 years during which the Treaty banned
even testing space-based, sea-based, air-based and mobile ground-based defenses,
we are free to develop, test and deploy the most effective ways to defend
America.
President Bush clearly seeks to fulfill his campaign
promise to build effective defenses, “by the earliest possible date.” On
December 17, 2002, he directed the Pentagon to field, by 2004-5, 16 ground-based
interceptors in Alaska, 4 ground-based interceptors in California, and 20
sea-based interceptors on 3 Aegis cruisers.
The Pentagon’s current program is dedicated to testing
in the Pacific Test Range – primarily in support of the ground-based interceptors
to be based in Alaska. In conducting these tests, interceptors are being
“fielded.” But they will provide little protection for Americans on
the East Coast. As indicated in the Virginia House of Delegates resolution
reproduced on page 4, sea-based interceptors could as easily be tested in
the Atlantic Test Range, leading to early defenses for the East Coast.
Otherwise, only the U.S. West coast will be defended by 2004-5. Hopefully,
Congress will take these views into account as they review the President’s
proposed missile defense programs.
Perhaps the greatest challenge will be in reviving a
serious program to field space-based interceptors, SDI’s most advanced development
effort. We must overcome the bureaucratic impedance of 30 years when
such defenses could not even be tested, and the collective amnesia resulting
from the decade after the Clinton administration killed the SDI programs and
purged the Pentagon of all who favored space defenses.
Recent statements by Pentagon officials suggest there
are plans to employ a space testbed, presumably to take advantage of the new
freedom to test space-based interceptors. However, there is no sign
that the most advanced technology resulting from the $30 billion investment
of the Reagan-Bush I years is being revived – and the anticipated funding
for the space testbed in the Pentagon’s proposed ~$9 billion budget for next
year is infinitesimal by comparison.
This sad state of affairs is hard for me to understand.
As readers of The Shield know, the most cost-effective SDI concept was the
Brilliant Pebbles space-based interceptor system, and it was fully approved
by the Pentagon’s acquisition bureaucracy in 1991 – the first of the SDI programs
to achieve that status. The flow of cutting edge SDI technology was
from space-to-ground, not the other way around as most people seem now to
think was the case. In fact, in many ways first generation 1990-vintage
space-based interceptor technology that was space-qualified by the 1994 Clementine
mission to the Moon is still more advanced than that being currently used
in fielding ground-based and sea-based interceptors.
Of some interest is the fact that a Clementine replica
now hangs in an honored place in the Smithsonian Institute because of its
scientific contributions in mapping the entire Moon’s surface with Brilliant
Pebbles instrumentation – and finding water on the Moon’s South Pole.
But alas, Brilliant Pebbles technology is not to be found in the Pentagon’s
missile defense programs.
Why is not Bush II taking advantage of the best technology from Bush I?
For two years, I believed it was because Bush II assigned the top priority
to discarding the ABM Treaty, and wanted to avoid controversy that would result
from reviving Brilliant Pebbles. While I did not agree with that position,
I could understand it – and I rationalized an excuse for the Pentagon’s focus
on making marginal improvements to much more expensive ground-based system
concepts designed more to be consistent with the Treaty than to provide an
effective defense.
Perhaps I am rationalizing again in suggesting the culprit
is collective amnesia of a Pentagon bureaucracy purged of space-defense advocates
by the Clinton administration – though that purging surely occurred.
But if that is not the Bush administration’s reason for not taking steps to
revive the key technology by involving the people who developed it, what is
the reason?
I am forced to consider a most troubling possibility
– namely that in negotiating with the Russians on reducing long-range nuclear
missiles, a side deal was struck not to revive space-based defense programs.
Recall that Russian authorities, like their Soviet predecessors,
resist our efforts to build effective defenses for the American people – and
especially space-based defenses – even if they are built cooperatively, as
we have proposed since 1985 when I began tabling such proposals in the Geneva
Defense and Space Talks.
Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov today sounds the same
themes of his Soviet predecessors – that if we defend ourselves it will be
“destabilizing.” (For example, see the Potpourri articles on pages 6-7.)
The only things they seem cooperative on are defenses against short-range
missiles – which they are modernizing and selling around the world, of course.
And to be sure, we have conducted several joint exercises with them during
the past five years. But they speak positively only for defenses of
the European part of NATO – not for defenses for the NATO contingent on this
side of the Atlantic. And they are adamantly opposed to space-based
defenses.
I hope my concern is misplaced. But the fact is
that nothing serious is being done to revive the most effective defense concepts
and associated technology developed by the Reagan-Bush I years. Until
that is done, Ronald Reagan’s vision will not be realized.
We at High Frontier remain resolved to win this one for
the Gipper. That means we will continue: 1) to remind all who will listen
of the achievements of the SDI program, before the Clinton administration
purged the system of the best and brightest and devoted its missile defense
efforts to concepts designed to fail; and 2) to resist all attempts to barter
away America’s right to exploit our cutting edge space technology.
Stay tuned!
STRATCOM GIVEN ROLE OF GLOBAL INTEGRATOR FOR MISSILE DEFENSE
President Bush has approved changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP), which
give the new U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska the role of global
integrator for missile defense. The command will plan, coordinate and
integrate global missile defense operations and act as the focal point for
U.S. missile defense capabilities, including supporting systems. Strategic
Command will have responsibility for developing desired characteristics and
capabilities for missile defense and all support for missile defense and for
providing warning of missile attack to the other combatant commanders.
This includes responsibility for sensors, communications, and planning; and
for coordination with the regional combatant commanders and the Missile Defense
Agency as appropriate. A primary mission will be providing space-based
theater ballistic missile warning to U.S. forces worldwide.
Three months shy of Ronald Reagan's
historic speech announcing his Cold War-winning Strategic Defense Initiative
and one year after announcing America's withdrawal from the anachronistic
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, President Bush ordered the Pentagon this
week to begin deploying an ABM system by 2004. Notwithstanding the fact that
it will be – by necessity – a modest, rudimentary system at the outset, the
president's bold decision represents a major development in U.S. defense policy
at the dawn of the new millennium.
"Throughout my administration," the president declared
on Wednesday, "I have made clear that the United States will take every necessary
measure to protect our citizens against what is perhaps the gravest danger
of all: the catastrophic harm that may result from hostile states or terrorist
groups armed with weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them."
In an era of massive ballistic-missile proliferation among rogue states and
their trading partners, it has become all the more imperative to defend against
such an attack, which is capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction
– nuclear, biological and chemical – over thousands of miles to the American
homeland. Today, the United States cannot defend itself against a single ballistic
missile, whether it is launched our way intentionally to inflict horrific
damage or by accident.
September 11 made clear how vulnerable the homeland is
to attacks by those whose sole mission is to inflict the maximum amount of
harm upon America. Some critics of deploying an ABM capability argue that
September 11 proved the nation is more vulnerable to internal terrorism actions
than to ballistic-missile attacks. Yet, the events are not mutually exclusive.
Indeed, several recent incidents involving North Korea, an indisputable member
of an axis of evil and arguably the world's most nefarious missile proliferator,
prove how dangerous the threat of ballistic-missile attack is. These North
Korean incidents include: the discovery of its hidden nuclear-weapons-development
program; its continuing clandestine trading of ballistic-missile technology
with Pakistan in exchange for nuclear-weapons technology; North Korea's reported
ongoing development of an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range
in excess of 6,000 miles; and North Korea's delivery of Scud missiles to Yemen.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld made clear that the initial deployment
will be the first stage of a very robust, multi-layered (land-, sea-, air-
and space-based) system. Yet, rudimentary though the ABM system will be in
its earliest stage, Mr. Rumsfeld also emphasized that it will be "better than
nothing."
Critics also complain that the systems scheduled for
early deployment – such as the sixteen ground-based interceptors to be based
at Fort Greely, Alaska, and the four interceptors at Vandenberg Air Force
Base in California – are still in their testing stage. Mr. Rumsfeld,
however, reminded those critics that the hugely successful Predator, the
unmanned aerial vehicle that recently launched a Hellfire missile killing
a top Al Qaeda operative in Yemen, entered service during the war in Afghanistan
before its testing was completed.
Bill Gertz of The Washington Times, who first revealed
that the president's decision to begin ABM deployment will be in 2004, also
reports that the Navy will deploy its SM-3 missile on Aegis-equipped warships.
These missiles will be capable of shooting down medium-range missiles. Additionally,
nearly 350 Patriot PAC-3 anti-missile systems will be deployed to defend against
short-range missiles, including several versions of the ubiquitous Scuds.
Clearly, Mr. Bush intends to fulfill his campaign commitment
to transform America's national security strategy and defense capabilities
to meet the threats of the 21st century.
Published in the December 20, 2002 Washington Times,
reprinted by permission.
The Old Dominion Speaks
Up for Missile Defense
By an overwhelming majority (76 yes, 12 no, 3 abstain, 9 no-votes), the
Virginia House of Delegates passed on February 1 a resolution endorsing President
Bush’s call for ocean-to-ocean multi-layered defense – of all 50 states –
and specifically urging East Coast testing similar to that being conducted
in the Pacific, to begin protecting the East Coast by 2005. In December,
President Bush directed that by 2005 the Pentagon is to field 16 ground-based
interceptors in Alaska, 4 ground-based interceptors in California and 20 sea-based
interceptors on 3 ships. If those ships are tested in concert with
existing East Coast radar, other sensors, and especially testing and related
operations in the Hampton Roads-Norfolk area, they could begin providing initial
protection of the Eastern Seaboard by 2005. Thus, both coasts of the
United States could end their complete vulnerability to even a single ballistic
missile by 2005. High Frontier commends Delegate John Cosgrove of Chesapeake,
Virginia for his initiative in sponsoring this important resolution, reproduced
on the following page; and, for the sake of the entire Eastern Seaboard,
hopes that the Bush administration and U.S. Congress will honor the Old Dominion’s
urgent request!
Commonwealth of Virginia – House of Delegates Resolution
– HR40
(Passed February 1, 2003)
Whereas Virginia, the Old Dominion, is located in the
upper South region of the United States and is populated by over 7,000,000
persons, and is noted for its contribution to the founding of the United States
through leadership and political thought, and maintains distinguished centers
of higher education and research, and is the site of advanced information
and defense technology, and is the center of national naval force concentration,
and is the foremost shipbuilder on its coast while possessing natural endowments
of mountains and forests on its western limits and agriculture on its southern
tier; and
Whereas, the people of Virginia are conscious of these
assets of the Old Dominion and a favorable future for their children and future
generations; and
Whereas, Virginia provided leadership in the Revolutionary
War and was the location of the surrender of Great Britain that ended it,
and has contributed notably to national defense through its citizenry both
in the military and industry ever since; and
Whereas, the people of Virginia are aware of the global
proliferation of short-range, medium-range and long-range ballistic missiles
as weapons of mass destruction and their threat to our nation, our allies,
and our armed forces abroad; and
Whereas, the United States does not possess an effective
defense against such missiles launched by hostile states or by terrorist organizations
within the borders of such states or from ships anywhere on the world’s seas
and oceans, including near to the coastal cities of America; and
Whereas, the President of the United States has withdrawn
from the treaty with the now extinct Soviet Union that prohibited American
effective self-defense against ballistic missile attack, and has announced
the deployment of a ground-based and sea-based limited missile defense system
by the year 2005 as a beginning towards a robust system that will be multi-layered,
meaning land, sea, air, and space interception components; and
Whereas, short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles
launched from ships off the East Coast of the United States will be outside
the protective reach of the Pacific Ocean-Alaska-based system, and the population
of Virginia’s tidewater as well as the preponderant national naval presence
located therein are now vulnerable and will be still vulnerable to such a
missile attack with warheads of mass destruction after planned fielding in
2005 of missile defenses in Alaska and California; and
Whereas, missile defense interceptors based in Alaska
and California may not be able to protect the population of Virginia’s tidewater
and other East Coast areas from long-range ballistic missiles launched from
threatening states in the Middle East and North Africa; and
Whereas, the United States Navy has demonstrated its
capability to use ships that can be based in Virginia’s Tidewater area to
intercept short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles while they are
rising from their launchers, which could be on nearby ships, and this capability
can be improved to intercept long-range ballistic missiles; now, therefore,
be it
Resolved by the House of Delegates:
That the Virginia House of Delegates hereby supports
the President of the United States to continue to take all actions necessary,
directing the considerable scientific and technological capability of this
great Union, to protect all 50 states and their people, our allies, and our
armed forces abroad from the threat of missile attack; and
That the Virginia House of Delegates hereby conveys to
the President of the United States and the Congress that a ocean-to-ocean,
effective missile defense system will require the deployment of a robust,
multi-layered architecture consisting of integrated land-based, sea-based,
air-based, and space-based capabilities to deter evolving future threats and
to meet and destroy them when necessary; and
That the Virginia House of Delegates urges the President
of the United States and Congress to plan and provide funding for a Tidewater
Virginia and East Coast Testbed activity, similar to the West Coast test activities
in Alaska, California, and the Pacific Ocean, leading by 2005 to an East
Coast sea-based defense – initially against ship-based short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles and, with improvements, against ballistic missiles of
all ranges launched from anywhere; and
That copies of this resolution shall be sent by the House
Clerk to the Virginia Congressional delegation, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the President of the Senate of the United States, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the President of the United States.
Anyone who doubts the urgency
of dealing with Saddam Hussein before the Iraqi dictator succeeds in his nuclear
ambitions should take a look at the crisis now unfolding on the Korean peninsula.
Kim Jong Il's latest attempts at blackmail only illustrate the dangers of
waiting too long to stop any dictator from getting his hands on nuclear weapons.
Already believed to possess at least a couple of nuclear weapons, North
Korea has in recent days signaled its intention to build many more. Having
disabled surveillance equipment and ordered international monitors out of
its reactor complex at Yongbyon, Pyongyang now threatens to reprocess thousands
of spent fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium, possibly within a matter
of months.
Let's be clear about this: The reason Kim Jong Il is
trying his hand again at what the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA)
calls "nuclear brinkmanship" is because his previous threats were met with
appeasement. When North Korea adopted a similar strategy in 1994, the Clinton
Administration caved and didn't insist on Pyongyang relinquishing the stockpile
of spent fuel rods that are now poised for reprocessing. Worse still, the
Clintonites set a precedent of rewarding Pyongyang by striking the Agreed
Framework, which offered two new nuclear reactors and free fuel oil in return
for a freeze on activities at Yongbyon.
Further bad behavior earned North Korea more goodies. When evidence emerged
that Pyongyang was cheating on its nuclear freeze, the Clinton Administration
simply offered another bribe – 600,000 tons in food aid – to inspect one suspect
site in 1999. But delays in following through allowed North Korea to clear
the site before the inspectors arrived. Even during their final days in office,
the Clintonites were trying to cut another deal to transfer space-launch
vehicle technology in return for a freeze on missile launches.
What remains a mystery is why anyone believed a brutal
regime that systematically starves its population, diverting desperately needed
food aid into sustaining the world's fifth-largest army, would keep its promises.
The North Koreans have behaved entirely true to form, starting a secret uranium-enrichment
program even while Wendy Sherman and the other architects of Clinton policy
were contemplating more payoffs.
You might have thought that those who got us into this
mess would be contrite by now. But not a bit of it. In recent days, Clinton-era
officials have been popping up on television talk shows to blame the present
crisis on the Bush Administration taking such a hard line on Pyongyang's nuclear
cheating and to advocate a return to their failed policy. Former State Department
official Joel Wit, a key coordinator of the Agreed Framework, even said on
CNN that nuclear blackmail "may be a fact of life" and the best way forward
is "to reach some sort of deal with North Korea."
We're disappointed to see even Richard Lugar, the new
head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, fall for this line. Senator
Lugar might recall that the North has broken every agreement it has ever struck
with the U.S., going back to the 1953 Korean War armistice. Or he might download
the IAEA Web site (www.iaea.org) history of the attempts to stop the North's
nuclear fuel reprocessing; it reads almost like President Bush's September
speech to the U.N. on Iraq.
The beginning of wisdom now is to realize that rewarding
bad behavior will only get more bad behavior -- not just in North Korea, but
from other would-be proliferators. The world is setting precedents in this
new era of global terror and nuclear weapons, and if Kim Jong Il succeeds
with his plans, the lesson learned by other rogue nations will be that Saddam's
mistake was that he didn't build his own nukes fast enough.
The Bush Administration seems to understand the dangers
of that outcome. It is quietly moving ahead with a strategy of isolation and
containment that makes more sense against impoverished North Korea than it
does against oil-rich Iraq. Starved of outside money and fuel, the Kim regime
might well crack.
This means marshaling a coalition, among North Korea's
Asian neighbors and the U.N. Security Council. The IAEA's board of governors
will meet early next month, and that nuclear watchdog has a duty to report
Pyongyang's violations to the Security Council. Washington is actively encouraging
a strongly worded report, in contrast to the early 1990s when some Clintonites
shamefully tried to persuade the IAEA to tone down its concerns. The choice
before the Security Council will be the same as over Iraq, either to act in
defense of its own credibility or forfeit that task to the U.S. and its allies.
The job of the latter might well include interdicting North Korean exports
on the high seas.
For their part, South Koreans must recognize that if
they want to continue to enjoy America's security umbrella, then will have
to show more concern about their northern neighbor's nasty proliferation
habits. South Korean President-elect Roh Moo Hyun has been talking more sense
about Pyongyang's nuclear program in recent days, suggesting that he is not
quite as eager for the Yankees to go home as he has sometimes sounded.
China is a historic friend of the Communist North, but
it also knows that the fastest route to a nuclear Japan is to tolerate a nuclear
Korea. Nor can the good relations with Washington that the Beijing leadership
craves remain unaffected if it continues to coddle Pyongyang.
Which brings us back to Iraq. One of the ironies of this
Korean crisis is that the same voices opposing action against Saddam Hussein
are now criticizing the Bush Administration for not screaming loudly enough
about North Korea. Perhaps the Bushies understand that if the U.S. takes care
of Saddam, Kim Jong Il will get the message.
Published in the December 30, 2002 Wall Street Journal,
reprinted with permission.
INDIA, U.S. WRAP UP MISSILE DEFENSE TALKS –
Aerospace Daily – January 21, 2003. Defense policy officials from the
U.S. and India have wrapped up two days of talk about U.S. missile defense
plans and about the possibility of Israel selling its Arrow anti-missile system
to India. Defense ministry official here said India faces missile a nuclear
threats from Pakistan and China and requires a missile defense system. The
U.S. has not yet decided whether to allow Israel to export the Arrow system
to India. . . . India wants six to eight anti-missile systems, although
defense officials here privately say the country will be hard pressed to
pay $3 billion to $5 billion for the systems. . . .
AMMAN SEEKS MISSILE DEFENCE – Financial Times (London) – January 21, 2003.
AMMAN – Fearful of being caught in the crossfire in a missile exchange between
Iraq and Israel, Jordan is belatedly seeking a European supplier for an air
defence anti-missile system. Jordanian officials said yesterday that regional
tensions lay behind their decision to look to Europe, rather than the U.S.,
after the collapse of an earlier deal to acquire a Russian surface-to-air
defence system. Officials in Amman said Moscow had failed to meet a
February deadline for an S-300 missile system, seeking a delay until the year
end. Jordan's King Abdullah II was quoted last week as saying that,
with war all but inevitable, Jordan was urgently seeking an alternative supplier
for three anti-missile batteries to defend its airspace. Jordan fears
that unless a supplier comes forward within days it will be forced to rely
on anti-missile cover from Israel and American warships deployed in the eastern
Mediterranean. . . .
CANADA SET FOR MAJOR MISSILE DEFENSE TALKS IN U.S – Reuters – January 26,
2003. Canadian officials hold talks in Washington this week on the proposed
U.S. missile defense system that could ultimately include equipment on Canadian
soil if Ottawa ends years of indecision and signs on. The Canadian government,
deeply split over the concept, has consistently declined to express an opinion
about missile defense on the grounds it has not been asked to take part.
But Ottawa now wants to know much more about Washington's plans after President
Bush last month ordered the military to begin deploying a missile defense
system with land-and sea-based interceptor rockets to be operational starting
in 2004. . . . Missile defense is becoming the most important issue ever
to arise in the highly-integrated Canadian-U.S. defense relationship, which
for the last 45 years has been centered on NORAD. Defense specialists
say the proposed system would be more effective if Ottawa permitted a special
radar station to be built in the Canadian Arctic.
ISRAELI AND AMERICAN TROOPS WIND UP JOINT MISSILE EXERCISES, DEFENSE MINISTER
PREDICTS U.S.-IRAQ WAR – Associated Press – February 4, 2003. Israeli
and American forces on Tuesday fired a salvo of Patriot missiles as part of
a joint exercise to test air defenses, and Israeli military officials said
a U.S.-Iraq war is apparently "inevitable." . . . Launched on Jan.
19, the exercise is now drawing to a close, a U.S. official said. The Maariv
newspaper said Tuesday that Patriot batteries now in place, and three more
on their way from Germany, fire an upgraded version of the missile, which
failed to hit any Scuds in the 1991 war. They are being used as a second line
of defense, while the main role goes to the U.S.-Israeli Arrow missiles, designed
to take out incoming Scuds at high altitude.
BRITAIN FORMALLY AGREES TO U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE – Reuters – February 5,
2003. Britain formally gave the go-ahead Wednesday to the United States'
request for Britain's help in its planned missile defense shield, saying
Washington could use a key radar base in northern England. Defense Secretary
Geoff Hoon said in a statement to Parliament that he would be writing to
the United States to give the green-light for the missile defense system,
which involves upgrading key early warning radar systems at Fylingdales.
. . . Many in Prime Minister Tony Blair's ruling Labor Party, already worried
about British involvement in a possible Iraq war, are bitterly opposed to
the system, arguing a missile defense shield could spark a new global arms
race.
RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT ON TARGET TO CONSIDER NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION TREATY THIS
SPRING, FOREIGN MINISTRY SAYS – Associated Press – January 21, 2003.
MOSCOW – The Russian Foreign Ministry said Tuesday that a nuclear arms reduction
treaty signed by the U.S. and Russian leaders at a Moscow summit last year
was on target to be ratified this spring. The treaty calls for the United
States and Russia to cut their strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,700 to 2,200,
down from 6,000 or more for the United States and about 5,500 for Russia.
. . . [Deputy chairman of the Duma's international affairs committee]
Kosachev said that the Duma version would base Russia's withdrawal options
on the U.S. deployment of a national missile defense system that created a
danger to Russian strategic forces or if other counties critically increase
their nuclear potential to a level threatening Russia's security. . . .
RUSSIA WANTS OUTER SPACE TO BE DEMILITARIZED – ITAR-TASS News Agency – February
4, 2003. Russia "comes out for the demilitarization of outer space and objects
to the deployment of attack weapons there," Russian Foreign Minister Igor
Ivanov stated here on Tuesday during his visit to the Khrunichev Space Research
and Production centre. "The use of outer space for military purposes," he
warned, "is fraught with serious dangers and may turn the near-earth space
into an arena of unbridled arms race. . . [T]his meets neither the interests
of Russia, nor of other nations. . . . Outer space must be an scene of peaceful
cooperation, not of military confrontation." Several negative factors have
lately appeared in the world, which runs counter to the interests of Russia,
the minister believes. "There are quite a few problems in the domain of strategic
stability, where certain complications are occurring due to the unilateral
U.S. actions," Ivanov presumes. "They include the withdrawal of the United
States from the ABM Treaty and the American plans to build up its own national
anti-missile defence system," he noted. In the minister's opinion, such steps
"are apt to trigger an arms race."
RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SAYS WASHINGTON'S MISSILE DEFENSE PLANS DESTABILIZING
– Associated Press – February 4, 2003. Russian Foreign Minister Igor
Ivanov on Tuesday reaffirmed Moscow's criticism of the U.S. missile defense
plans, saying they were harmful for Russia's security and global strategic
stability. "Some negative trends in global politics challenge Russia's security
interests," Ivanov said on a visit to the Khrunichev State Research and Production
Center, Russia's top rocket manufacturer. . . . Washington's plans to develop
a missile shield "may trigger a new race of missiles and counter-missiles,"
Ivanov said in speech before space officials. Ivanov tempered his criticism
of the U.S. missile defense plans by hailing an arms reduction agreement Putin
and U.S. President George W. Bush signed last year. The treaty, "to a large
extent has filled the legal vacuum left by the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty," Ivanov said. "We have a real mechanism to search for solutions through
cooperation, not confrontation," he said. Ivanov said that Russia was eager
to cooperate with NATO partners in developing defenses against short-range
ballistic missiles. "This cooperation is necessary and feasible ... and it
must involve a broad circle of participants," he said. "Such approach could
be used not only in Europe, but other regions of the world."
CHINA SUCCESSFULLY TESTS MULTI-WARHEAD MISSILES – The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo,
Japan) – February 8, 2003. China successfully test-launched a medium-range
missile with multiple warheads in December 2002, indicating a rapid modernization
of China's nuclear missile capability aimed at countering the U.S. missile
defense network planned for the region, sources said Friday. The launching
of the Dong Feng-21 (DF-21), with a target range of about 1,800 kilometers,
was the first successful test launch of the missile with multiple warheads
for China. . . . It is believed that the multiple independently targetable
reentry vehicle (MIRV), which China had sought to develop quickly, was used
for the missile. . . . China has been trying to quickly develop a multiple-warhead
missile system to counter the missile defense network being pursued by the
administration of U.S. President George W. Bush on the U.S. mainland and in
east Asia and to deter U.S. military pressure, Chinese diplomatic sources
said. . . .
U.S.: N. KOREANS MIGHT FIRE MISSILE – Philadelphia Inquirer – February 11,
2003. The U.S ambassador to Japan, Howard H. Baker Jr., warned yesterday
that North Korea may try to fire another missile over Japan as part of a pattern
of escalating "provocation." "We hear reports that they may engage
in a missile test, perhaps overflying the island of Japan," the ambassador
said, citing intelligence as well as news reports. "They've done it... before,
and there certainly is no guarantee they won't do it again. It's a realistic
prospect." . . . Over the weekend, Japanese newspapers reported that the Japanese
government planned to alert the nation if it received indications that North
Korea might attempt to launch another missile. . . .
JAPAN WARNS OF FIRST STRIKE – Washington Post – Reuters – February 14, 2003.
TOKYO – Japan would launch a strike against North Korea if it had evidence
that Pyongyang was preparing to attack with missiles, Defense Minister Shigeru
Ishiba said. "It is too late if [a missile] flies towards Japan. . . Our nation
will use military force as a self-defense measure if [North Korea] starts
to resort to arms against Japan," he said, adding that Japan could regard
the fueling of a missile as the start of military attack if it determined
that the missile was pointed at Japan. Ishiba said that Japan would
only attack North Korea as a clearly defensive measure. "We differentiate
this from the concept of a 'pre-emptive strike', " he said. . . .
MILITARY TO STUDY MISSILE DEFENSE – Taipei Times (Taiwan) – February
14, 2003. Minister of National Defense Tang Yao-ming yesterday announced
that the military has set up a task force to plan for the establishment of
a comprehensive missile defense system. "Within 10 years, we expect to have
the capabilities to effectively defend against China's ballistic missiles,"
Tang said. Tang did not go into detail about the missile defense system (MDS)
that the military is developing. But it was the first time that Tang made
public a timetable for the development of the MDS, which had aroused much
speculation from the press. At the press conference, Tang talked about how
the development of the MDS could counter China's development of ballistic
missiles. . . . The development of MDS will be divided into three stages,
defense sources said. At the first stage, the military will build and deploy
land-based missile interceptors and sensors (mainly radar) across the country.
The Patriot PAC-III missile defense system and a long-range radar are to be
the key elements of the MDS at this stage. The second stage will extend the
deployment of missile interceptors and sensors to the sea. The Kidd-class
destroyers are to be the platform for the interceptors and sensors. At the
final stage, the military will seek to acquire airborne missile interceptors
and sensors. . . .
As 2002 makes
its way into the history books, High Frontier has been taking stock.
Sad to say there’s been too little accomplished and far too much still undone.
The best news is that President Bush discarded the ABM
Treaty on June 13 – and for the first time in 30 years, America’s engineers
and scientists are free to test and deploy the most effective defenses they
can conceive – rather than being constrained to consider only fixed ground-based
defenses of the sort at the cutting edge in the 1960s. The bad news is that
no one seems to remember lessons learned during the Reagan-Bush I Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) era about how much more effective defenses based
other ways can be.
For example, at year’s end there still are, at most,
hints of a possible serious program to build space-based interceptors, easily
the most cost effective way to protect Americans at home and our overseas
troops, friends and allies – as High Frontier has argued for 20 years and
as was demonstrated in 1989-92, before the Clinton administration killed
the effort.
The Defense Science Board (DSB), which advises Defense
Secretary Rumsfeld on technology matters, was relatively silent on this important
potential in its Summer Study briefing report, but may be recommending a new
initiative to develop space-based interceptors in its final report due shortly.
The DSB Summer Study did recommend an expanded Navy missile
defense program, and there are signs that the Pentagon may be responding positively
– that would be welcome, though tardy. This year, there were three
successful tests of the Navy’s Theater Wide interceptor – the most recent
one hit its target missile while it was rising from its launch pad.
If the Navy’s inherent capability were fully exploited, we could, within
a year, begin to protect our ports from possible short-range missiles that
might be launched from container ships a hundred or so miles off our coasts.
This is perhaps the most pressing missile defense threat
we face as we move toward possible war with Iraq. There are about 16,000
containers that enter U.S. ports each day – and we cannot inspect more than
a few of them. As we pointed out in our last issue of The Shield, Defense
Secretary Rumsfeld recently emphasized how easy it is to hide SCUDS of the
sort used in the 1991 Gulf War among these containers, launch them at our
cities and then quickly hide the launching equipment. This is not a
hypothetical, nor a new threat – it involves 1940s technology, first demonstrated
in the 1940s; and its plausibility was just demonstrated.
As discussed in the following pages, we recently found
15 Scuds on a North Korean ship bound for Yemen, a terrorist haven.
(Recall that in October 2000 al Qaeda terrorists rammed their explosive laden
suicide boat into the USS Cole, killing 17 American sailors.) While
news accounts of this successful intercept emphasize its proliferation implications,
it also illustrates that rogue states can and do indeed ship such short-range
missiles.
More importantly, in this incident, we permitted the
North Korean ship to continue on its merry way when Yemen protested that
they were making a legal purchase of the Scuds – never mind that they had
committed to our Ambassador in Sanaa that it was “neither the policy nor
practice of the government of Yemen to import” such materials from North
Korea. Perhaps we backed away from a confrontation with Yemen because
it has promised to side with us in the war on terrorism – and perhaps not
to repeat its 1991 backing of Saddam Hussein, should we again go to war with
Iraq in the near future. Perhaps we wanted to avoid a major confrontation
with North Korea just now. Diplomacy can make for strange bedfellows!
Thus, a key lesson is that we cannot have confidence
that we always can stop such potentially threatening cargo at sea – even
when, as in this case, intelligence provides sufficient warning to intercept
such a threat – in this case, as it came within 600 miles of its destination.
We need a better understanding of when the international law protecting the
freedom of the seas can be trumped by our right of self-defense!
While lawyers debate this weighty subject, it is clear
we need to defend against such missiles launched at American coastal cities.
We can do this job. If a relatively small investment had been made 18-months
ago when we started pressing this case, such a capability would be patrolling
our coasts today – but alas we are absolutely vulnerable to this threat and
will remain so for some time – possibly until after we go to war with Iraq.
Hopefully, the Pentagon will soon act to enable the Navy to give us this
urgently needed capability.
Among the good news from 2002 is that Congress almost
fully funded the President’s budget request – almost $8 billion. That’s
enough money for a very robust program to build effective defenses.
The bad news is that, so far, the Pentagon has no coherent plan to build anything.
Most of the money is for “test bed” activities in Alaska, and that test bed
may, by 2004 or 2005, have some limited capability to shoot down a couple
of long range ballistic missiles launched toward the United States.
But this system concept, inherited from the Clinton administration, will
never be very effective – it was designed more to be consistent with the
ABM Treaty than to satisfy the needs of an effective defense. In particular,
it will have no capability against the “container ship” threat discussed
above.
As we look ahead to 2003 and to the uncertainties of
a possible war with Iraq coupled with an increasingly belligerent nuclear-armed
North Korea – not to mention the continuing terrorist threat, it is urgent
to revive the
most effective programs produced by the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
of the Reagan-Bush I era.
For example, after eight Clinton years and almost two years of Bush II,
little trace of SDI’s most cost-effective defense concept – the Brilliant
Pebbles space-based interceptor – is discernable among currently ongoing
missile defense programs. Perhaps the records were destroyed during
the Clinton years – although Dr. Don Baucomb, the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) historian who came to SDI during the early 1990s, published an authoritative
review of The Rise and Fall of Brilliant Pebbles last October. (See
page 6.)
We must overcome this collective amnesia – and recall
the state of affairs before Defense Secretary Les Aspin in 1993 boasted the
Clinton administration was “taking the stars out of Star Wars” – and, among
other things, cancelled all aspects of the Brilliant Pebbles space-based interceptor
program. Not only did he cancel this important effort, he purged Brilliant
Pebbles concepts and technology from all missile defense programs – denying
significant advantages over technology in which the Clinton Pentagon then
invested over $30 billion between 1993 and 2000.
A revival is in order. May that be the accounting
for 2003 when we take stock a year from now!
CIA Director George Tenet, speaking
at the Nixon Center on December 11, again warned that Osama bin Laden's al
Qaeda network continues as a serious a threat despite having been dealt several
blows in the war on terrorism resulting from their September 11, 2001 attack
on the United States. Among other things, he said:
"Intelligence information tells us the al Qaeda leadership
has been rattled by recent losses and is taking more precautions. But let's
be clear, there is no letup in the threat at this moment. Intelligence
clearly shows al Qaeda is still preparing terrorist attacks. Indeed,
every al Qaeda operations officer and facilitator that we have so far captured
was in the midst of preparing attacks when they were captured."
Tenet said al Qaeda tapes featuring Osama bin Laden and
released about the same time as recent al Qaeda attacks in Bali, Kuwait and
the Kenyan city of Mombasa were designed to bolster morale among al Qaeda
recruits. He emphasized that we must act to counter bin Laden’s efforts
– "We need to show al Qaeda's potential recruits that al Qaeda is failing
in every possible respect. If we can't take them off the board, we have
to keep them on the run."
In addition to these recent terrorist attacks leading
to fatalities, al Qaeda failed in an attempt to shoot down with missiles an
Israeli airliner. And al Qaeda member Suleiman Abu Ghaith vowed in an audio
statement released by an Islamic Web site that there would be "bigger and
more lethal operations" to come. According to Tenet, "They would be
foolish to make so bold a threat unless they were confident that some impending
operation had a high probability of success. We would be foolish to
take these threats with anything other than the utmost seriousness."
Earlier on September 11, Tenet and his agency were criticized
after the release of a report by a House-Senate Intelligence panel that examined
intelligence community failures before the Sept. 11 attacks. Sen. Richard
C. Shelby of Alabama, the Senate panel's top Republican and a persistent critic
of Tenet, said, "There have been more massive failures of intelligence on
his watch as director of CIA than any director in the history of the agency."
Recounted in the following pages is an intelligence success
– one that correctly identified 15 North Korean Scuds being transported on
a ship to the Middle East. Nevertheless, our response leaves a sense
of continuing unease.
A most significant international
drama began on December 10, and its first act ended barely two days later
– it’s unclear when the curtain will rise on Act 2 and even more uncertain
how the drama will end.
As noted in the following article (and others), the drama
actually began at least several weeks earlier when the intelligence community
discovered a ship leaving a North Korean port thought to be carrying ballistic
missile technology – and tracked its movement into the Arabian Sea.
Numerous press accounts on December 11th and 12th revealed that the United
States first checked with the Yemeni government to see if it knew about the
shipment, and upon its denial persuaded our Spanish allies to stop, board
and search the North Korean freighter sailing under a Cambodian flag within
600 miles of Yemen. U.S. military explosives experts worked with Spanish
special forces to discover buried under bags of cement 15 Scuds, their conventional
warheads, and 85 drums of unidentified chemicals. Then, the Yemeni government
claimed it was legally purchasing these Scuds from North Korea – despite
their July 2001 and August 2002 pledges to stop purchasing North Korean missile
technology.
Astonishingly, the North Korean ship was released to
deliver its cargo as planned – reportedly because the Yemeni government has
pledged to work with the U. S. in the war on terrorism. Yemen, which
backed Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War, is a terrorist haven – witness the
October 2000 al Qaeda suicide boat that rammed the USS Cole in the Yemeni
port of Aden, killing 17 American sailors. More recently, Yemeni officials
have cooperated with the U.S. – including on an attack in Yemen that killed
six al Qaeda operatives including one of Osama bin Laden’s lieutenants.
Curiously, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer stated the U.S. “had no choice
but to obey international law.” A December 12 Wall Street Journal
Editorial poignantly queried, “Does this mean that if the Scuds were headed
for Iraq or Libya we would also return them? If the Bush doctrine of
preemption means anything, the U.S. should have the right to confiscate weapons
sold by, and headed for, sponsors of terror.”
Indeed, just how much does international law constrain
our right of self-defense? Meanwhile, what message has this saga sent
to North Korea regarding U.S. resolve in preventing its sale and shipment
of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction? Perhaps the second
act of this unfolding drama will get to these important questions.
U.S. Lets Ship Take Missiles To Yemen
By Nicholas Kralev
The United States yesterday allowed a seized North
Korean missile shipment bought by the Yemeni government to reach its destination,
after Yemen promised the delivery would go no farther and it would not purchase
arms from Pyongyang again.
The Scud missile transfer, which Yemen said was
the last in a series contracted several years ago, violates no international
laws or regulations, senior U.S. officials said. But they said something must
be done to prevent weapons proliferation by North Korea.
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, after a flurry
of phone calls between top Bush administration officials and the Yemeni government,
informed President Ali Abdullah Saleh around noon yesterday that the cargo
ship would be released.
"We recognized that it was going to a country that
we have good relations with," Mr. Powell said shortly after his conversation
with Mr. Saleh. "We had assurance that these missiles were for Yemeni defensive
purposes and under no circumstances would they be going anywhere else."
Mr. Saleh also guaranteed "this was the last of
a group of shipments that go back some years and this would be the end of
it," Mr. Powell said in a speech after receiving an award from the American
Academy of Diplomacy.
Before that final phone call with the Yemeni president,
Mr. Powell spoke twice with Yemeni Foreign Minister Abu-bakr al-Qerbi. Then
Vice President Richard B. Cheney had a conversation with Mr. Saleh, State
Department spokesman Richard Boucher told reporters.
The unflagged ship, which was stopped and searched
by two Spanish warships in the Arabian Sea on Monday, was carrying 15 Scud
missiles, 15 conventional warheads and 85 drums of unidentified chemicals,
U.S. officials said.
"We have looked at this matter thoroughly," said
White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer. "There is no provision under international
law prohibiting Yemen from accepting delivery of missiles from North Korea."
Although there was no legal basis for preventing
the ship from reaching the Yemeni shore, officials said some in the Bush administration
were against releasing the vessel, arguing that Yemen had broken a promise
to the United States.
Mr. Boucher acknowledged the Yemeni government
had pledged to end its purchases of missile technology from North Korea twice
— first in July 2001 and then again last August. But that promise applied
only to new contracts and not those already signed, he said.
Yemen, an Arab state, in the past gave refuge to
al Qaeda members and other terrorists. The USS Cole was at port in the Yemeni
city of Aden when an al Qaeda bomb attack in 2000 killed 17 U.S. sailors.
But since the September 11 attacks, it has become a U.S. ally in the war on
terrorism.
Although it is free to import arms, Washington
is concerned that such missile technology could be used by Iraq, which is
under U.N. embargo, and other states sponsoring terrorism.
The Scud shipment, which was first disclosed by
The Washington Times 10 days ago, had been detected by U.S. intelligence upon
leaving the North Korean port of Nampo several weeks ago and was followed
closely as the ship made its way to the Arabian Sea.
On Monday, the United States asked Spain to inspect
the ship. Its vessels were "at the right place at the right time," Mr. Boucher
said with a smile.
"We were very suspicious about the ship," he said.
"At first one couldn't verify the nationality of the ship, because the ship's
name and the indications of nationality on the hull and the funnel were obscured.
It was flying no flag.
"So a ship like this, acting suspiciously in a
sensitive part of the world, carrying what might be missiles from North Korea,
is obviously going to get a lot of attention," he said.
The crew, which said both its members and the vessel
were Cambodian, refused to let the Spanish aboard. They fired warning shots
and contacted the Cambodian authorities, who told them they had no ship with
the name So San, which was painted on it, but nevertheless gave the Spanish
permission to board.
Once Spanish and — on Tuesday — U.S. inspectors
climbed aboard the ship, about 600 miles off the Yemeni shore, they found
irregularities in the cargo and the documentation, and found the Scuds under
bags of cement, Mr. Boucher said.
U.S. officials refused to speculate on why the
missiles were hidden under cement bags.
Mr. Boucher said the United States contacted the
Yemeni government, which said the missiles were destined for its army and
demanded them back.
North Korea, which is part of President Bush's
"axis of evil," admitted in October to having developed a secret nuclear
program in violation of a 1994 agreement with the United States. This latest
shipment has heightened concerns about its missile exports.
"They continue to be the single largest proliferator
of ballistic missile technology on the face of the earth, and they are putting
into the hands of many countries the technologies and capabilities which have
the potential for killing hundreds of thousands of people," Defense Secretary
Donald H. Rumsfeld told reporters during a visit to the Gulf nation of Qatar
yesterday.
Published in the December 12, 2002, Washington Times, reprinted with
permission.
The above saga illustrates why the United States should
move with dispatch to end its total vulnerability to attack by short-range
ballistic missiles launched from ships off our coasts. As we pointed
out in the last issue of The Shield, Defense Secretary Don Rumsfeld has noted
that such ships may hide ballistic missiles and their launchers – which may
escape detection. Since then, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz,
speaking to an October 24th Frontiers of Freedom Conference on Capitol Hill,
pointed out that launching from ships is hardly a new idea:
“The United States test launched a captured German V-2
rocket from the deck of a ship in 1947. And recently we have observed indications
of an outlaw state attempting to do the same thing with a short-range ballistic
missile from a ship. We need to ensure defense capabilities against a range
of novel threats and enemy concepts of operation, not just the classic scenarios.”
Since some 16,000 containers enter our ports each day and only a small fraction
are inspected at their ports of debarkation, this is hardly a hypothetical
threat. And the recent events show that even when we have intelligence
information, there are international legal constraints that may inhibit our
ability to stop such traffic in international waters – beyond 12 miles off
our coasts. Scuds that can travel 300 to 600 miles in such scenarios
can threaten well over half of America’s citizens. Only an active defense
can provide confident protection against this very real threat.
On November 22, the Navy made it three hits in a row
from the USS Lake Erie a few hundred miles from Hawaii, with its intercept
of a ballistic missile fired from the Navy’s Pacific Missile Range on western
Kauai. The earlier tests this year (in January and June) hit their
target missiles above the atmosphere in space, after they had reached their
highest points and were on the way back down. This time, the intercept
occurred in space as the target missile was still rising – in its ascent
phase. According to a Pentagon spokesman, the USS Lake Erie fire control
officer had a window of only 70 to 85 seconds to detect the target and launch
his interceptor.
The three successful Navy demonstrations this year set
a stage for programmatic acceleration, which would be responsive to a recent
Defense Science Board summer study that recommended that greater emphasis
be given to developing boost- and ascent-phase sea-based defenses. So
the time is ripe for moving ahead as quickly as possible to build an initial
operating capability – and then to improve it as quickly as possible.
As readers of The Shield are well aware, High Frontier has been championing
such a sea-based defense for years – indeed, had the Pentagon followed our
recommendations, such defenses could have been operating years ago to protect
our coastal cities.
The U.S. policy dilemma with
North Korea was underscored this week by the temporary seizure of the North
Korean ship “So San” by Spanish and U.S. naval forces. The vessel was sailing
under illegal markings to deliver 15 Scud missiles to our new Yemeni ally
in the war on terror. The Bush administration took the only possible measured
course of action and released the vessel to continue its voyage. The dilemma
is acute since U.S. policy has clearly sanctioned North Korea, which Donald
Rumsfeld has called the “single largest proliferator of ballistic missile
technology on the face of the earth.”
In the short run there are no good U.S. options to deal
with North Korea. Patient diplomacy must attempt to hold in place the empty
strictures of the 1994 Agreed Framework, a brilliantly negotiated blueprint
that could, with the continued cooperation of the U.S., South Korea, and Japan,
being to bear economic, political, and military coercion sufficient to produce
a serious response by North Korea.
The North Koreans are a huge, immediate, and unpredictable
threat to the security of South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. military forces
in the region. A million-man army, which has in uniform 20% of the military
age male population, consumes 31% of the GDP in this land of misery and starvation.
The 10 million innocent people of Seoul live within the potential range of
11,000-plus North Korean artillery weapons.
The North also explicitly talks to the threat of “big
powerful weapons” - read weapons of mass destruction. As early as April 1996,
they hinted at possessing four missiles with nuclear warheads already targeting
Japan and South Korea. There is solid intelligence evidence that in theory
North Korea could already possess four to five nuclear weapons produced from
plutonium in the 8,000 fuel rods removed from the Yongbyon Reactor in 1989.
They have two more reactors under construction since 1984 that, if completed,
could produce adequate plutonium for 30 atomic bombs per year.
In addition, the North Koreans have an enormous, weaponized
chemical and biological warfare program. Despite have signed the Biological
Weapons Convention of 1987, the North Koreans may have some 13 germ or virus
biological agents, as well as the capacity to produce annually a ton of new
biowarfare material. Senior State Department official John Bolton states,
“The U.S. government believes that North Korea has one of the most robust
offensive bioweapons programs on earth.”
Their chemical weapons stockpiles may exceed 5,000 tons of nerve gas, blood
agents, and choking chemicals. The North Koreans have also invested considerable
resources in defensively equipping and training both their armed forces and
the entire civil population in order to survive and fight in a chemical environment.
This may indicate a serious readiness to use their chemical warfare capability
in offensive action.
Finally, we are facing a gigantic North Korean missile
development program, which has acted in secret collusion with Pakistan, Syria,
Libya, Iran, and Yemen. Their next customers could include terrorist organizations.
They have produced and deployed more than 500 Scud missiles, all of which
are believed capable of carrying chemical and biological weapons. Their 500
kilometer basic Scud C can target most of South Korea. They are now mass-producing
liquid fuel No Dong missiles on mobile launchers with a range of 1300 km.
Those missiles can effectively target Japan and U.S. regional military forces.
In August 1998, North Koreans test-fired the Taepo-Dong
One three-stage missile over the Japanese mainland with a range in excess
of 6,000 km. They are now developing a huge missile, the Taepo Dong Two, which
has ICBM capability to reach the western U.S. Left unchecked, this new weapon
of mass destruction may appear in less than a decade.
There is no easy answer to the national security threat
posed by North Korea to the U.S. and our crucial regional allies. The Chinese
and Russians seem to share the growing anxiety posed by this isolated land
of misery and poverty. It is, however, clear that Pyongyang must be held in
loose check for at least 12 months until we deal successfully with the acute
stage of the Iraqi crisis. We may have to take short-range policy options
that are unpalatable. Food aid and medical supplies to North Korea should
continue unchecked and should not be linked to any national security issue.
Delivery of fuel oil supplies required by the Agreed Framework should be halted
entirely and specifically linked to North Korean diplomatic approval to allow
IAEA inspectors free, unrestricted access to verify the 1992 Safeguard Agreement.
Finally, the U.S. and North Korea must immediately exchange
diplomatic missions to begin direct political discussions. The North Koreans
are going to use the coming year to rush nuclear weapons into production and
operational deployment. We must attempt to forestall this WMD proliferation
through direct diplomacy or else we may be forced into pre-emptive military
action within the next five years. Clearly, the seizure of the North Korean
ship “So San” signals of era of continuing great peril.
Gen. McCaffrey, the Olin Professor of National Security Studies at West
Point, led the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division in the Gulf War. Published
in the December 12, 2002, Wall Street Journal, reprinted with permission.
After eight Clinton years and almost
2 years of Bush II with the Clinton missile defense team still in charge,
no trace of the important features of either the most cost-effective defense
concept or the most advanced technology programs from the Reagan-Bush I Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) is discernable among currently ongoing missile defense
programs.
Perhaps the records were destroyed during the Clinton years – although Dr.
Don Baucomb, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) historian who came to SDI during
the early 1990s, published an authoritative review of The Rise and Fall of
Brilliant Pebbles at the October 2001 International Flight Symposium sponsored
by the North Carolina First Flight Centennial Commission. Consider a
few facts from the past:
· Beginning in 1987, the Brilliant Pebbles concept
was developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories to overcome the
shortcomings of previous space-based interceptor concepts, which were not
cost-effective components of a layered space and ground-based defense system.
It exploited commercially available sensor, computer and propulsion technology
under disciplined management successfully to improve the effectiveness, while
reducing the size, weight, and cost, of each interceptor – in some cases by
orders of magnitude.
· Unlike its predecessor space-based interceptor
concepts, the Brilliant Pebbles constellation could function autonomously
after being authorized by an appropriate authority – this feature enabled
high-confidence testing and assured a robustly survivable defense system that
could be controlled by a very small ground crew. Each Pebble accomplished
its own orbital “station-keeping” (without needing ground control); could
sense the launch of ballistic missiles within its reach and track them; calculate
not only its own intercept opportunities but also those of its neighbor Pebbles
(whose known location and targeting algorithms permitted each Pebble to estimate
what its neighbors would sense and assess as their attack opportunities and
optimum targeting strategies); decide, based on its own assessment, whether
to intercept any of the observed ballistic missiles; and if so announce to
its neighboring Pebbles which ballistic missile it was intercepting – so neighboring
Pebbles would not attack that same missile.
· In principle, Pebbles was an inherently layered
defense – it could be programmed to intercept ballistic missiles in their
“boost phase,” while their rockets were still burning and before releasing
decoys and other countermeasures; in their midcourse phase, when discriminating
the threatening warheads from decoys can be a very difficult problem; and
high in the Earth’s atmosphere when during reentry lighter decoys decelerate
faster than the attacking warhead, easing its identification. In time,
all options were incorporated into the Pebbles concept.
· In his February 1989 end-of-tour report, Lieutenant
General James Abrahamson, the first SDI Director, recommended accelerating
the Brilliant Pebbles program – and indicated that the concept could be tested
within 2-years and the initial constellation deployed within 5-years.
His successor, Lieutenant General George Monahan, formed a highly motivated
Brilliant Pebbles Task Force, to accelerate a program then being subjected
to numerous critical internal and external reviews in 1989-90 – referred to
by the Dr. Baucomb, as a “Season of Studies.” Indeed, the Brilliant
Pebbles was the most thoroughly scrubbed missile defense concept ever considered
by the Pentagon – and it passed with flying colors.
· For example, the JASON – an elite group of university
physicists not noted for supporting missile defense programs critically reviewed
all aspects of the program and found “no showstoppers.” The Defense
Science Board also critically reviewed the program, noted that the design
had thus far been examined by a number of competent and independent groups,
and found “no fundamental flaws.” The Brilliant Pebbles Task Force folded
JASON and DSB recommendations for improvement into the subsequent program.
· Ambassador Hank Cooper, High Frontier’s Chairman,
conducted a Presidentially mandated review of the SDI program for then Defense
Secretary Dick Cheney and recommended in March 1990 that Brilliant Pebbles
become the baseline space component of a refocused architecture, called Global
Protection Against Limited Strikes – or GPALS. In this architecture
intended to intercept ballistic missiles of ranges greater than a few hundred
miles launched from anywhere on Earth, Cooper recommended that 60-percent
of a raid involving up to 200 attacking weapons be assigned to the Pebbles
– and that they focus on killing attacking missiles/weapons in: 1) boost and
post-boost ascent phase before warheads or decoys are released; 2) midcourse
phase when unsophisticated penetration aids are involved (Cooper was very
impressed by the discrimination problem and did not believe we could solve
it with confidence without sophisticated active discrimination methods – and
so was prepared to withhold against daunting challenges and save ammunition.
At the same time, with a significant number of possible targets without sophisticated
penetration aids that it made sense to include some real possibilities as
Pebbles targets.) and 3) high endo-atmospheric reentry (which strips away
light-weight decoys revealing the real warheads for attack) while the pebbles
can maintain maneuverability – we had test data indicating this was a valid
and effective attack strategy from space. Later, as the third SDI Director,
Cooper became the principal advocate within the Pentagon and with Congress,
allies and in public to include these architectural features in the first
Bush Administration’s program.
· After several additional reviews and studies,
these recommendations were included in the baseline concept, a competition
was held among six industry teams, and two (TRW/Hughes and Martin Marietta)
were selected to develop the Pebbles under SDI’s first fully approved Major
Defense Acquisition Program. The cost of development, testing, deployment
and operations of about 1000 Pebbles for 20 years was estimated by the Pentagon’s
independent cost estimating group to be $11 billion. Substantial progress
was made on the technical front, but against major political headwinds: in
the Congress, which cut the President’s budget during the Bush I Administration,
and throughout the Clinton Administration, which killed the program in early
1993. The Pentagon’s Inspector General reported in 1994 that the Pebbles
program had been managed “efficiently and cost-effectively within the funding
constraints imposed by Congress” and observed that termination of key contracts
“was not a reflection on the quality of program management.” Politics,
not technology, ended the Pebbles program in 1993.
· Nevertheless, all key Brilliant Pebbles components
were space qualified in 1994. The Clementine mission used the full complement
of Pebbles sensors (15 spectral bands) to map the entire surface of the Moon
and discover water at its South Pole. The small technical team that
accomplished this impressive feat was given well-deserved awards by the National
Academy of Sciences and NASA – and a replica of the Clementine spacecraft
now has an honored place in the Smithsonian. An entire issue of the
Academy’s journal, Science, was devoted to papers on the 1.7 million frames
of Clementine data made available to the scientific community on the Internet.
The miniature Pebbles propulsion elements were demonstrated on an ASTRID
flight in 1994. So all first-generation Pebbles technology was proven
in 1994. President Clinton used his fleeting line item veto authority
to kill Congressionally directed and funded Clementine follow-on programs
because, as White House spokesman said, they were developing space-based interceptor
technology that would violate the ABM Treaty.
· The key technology has continued to mature even
though the Pentagon has invested essentially nothing for a decade to move
it forward. For example, industry has demonstrated a wide set of skills
needed to economically produce, deploy and operate large numbers of low-altitude
satellites – such as Pebbles. The $5 billion Iridium satellite telephoney
system built on Pebbles technology and concepts – although a failure for its
commercial investors, a small Pentagon crew is now operating this 66-satellite
constellation at costs comparable to those predicted for Brilliant Pebbles.
Great Britain’s University of Surrey regularly is orbiting “microsatellites”
– so much of the key technology is becoming available internationally.
Given Dr. Baucomb’s analysis, it seems like a no-brainer that this important
program, which was the best produced by $30 billion invested in SDI during
the Reagan-Bush I years, should be revived – especially now that the ABM Treaty
no longer blocks its development and testing. Yet the Pentagon continues
to stall all efforts to revive serious Pebbles development activity.
This condition is doubly troublesome because that technology can also greatly
improve other missile defense concepts – as recommended by the critical reviews
of 1989-90, initiated during Bush I, and cancelled by the Clinton Pentagon.
For example, the lightweight Pebbles components could greatly enhance the
capability of sea-based interceptor options. The Pentagon’s currently
favored unimaginative approach would use much heavier kill vehicle technology
being developed for ground-based interceptors – that leads to a requirement
for a new large missile that cannot fit in the Navy’s existing Vertical Launch
System and requires an expensive new launch system which will uniquely configure
the ships to support missile defense missions, significantly increasing the
cost and reducing the flexibility of such ships in supporting fleet operations.
It is much less expensive and will provide the Navy with much greater flexibility
to use the Pebbles technology to build a lightweight kill vehicle that fits
on a missile in the existing VLS deployed around the world to launch the Navy’s
air defense Standard Missile interceptor and Tomahawk cruise missile.
How to revive this important program? The Pentagon
needs to return to those who developed the original concept and demonstrated
the key technology on the Clementine mission – at the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory and the Naval Research Laboratory. That is where the key
concepts have been kept alive for the past decade, and they can repeat their
performance in getting the technology ready for rapid transfer to industry
– which must again adjust to the Pebbles architectural way of thinking.
As Jim Abrahamson noted in his February 1989 end of tour
report, this still innovative technology can be tested in two years and deployed
in five – provided, of course, a viable program is fully funded and staffed
with competent technical people. Let’s have new blood – untainted by
the Clinton years – work with Livermore and others to understand how it was
done before, and then go back to the future.
On June 13, 2001, the United
States withdrew from the ABM Treaty – and for the first time in over 30 years
of abiding by this treaty that sought to make a virtue of America’s vulnerability,
we are free to develop, test and deploy sea-based, air-based and space-based
defenses seriously intended to protect the American people!
But now to build these most effective and relatively
inexpensive defenses, we must overcome: 1) Bureaucratic inertia from
30 years that precluded such development, testing and deployment – especially
after a decade without serious examination of the technology that